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DIGNITY: THE NEW FRONTIER OF STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
SCOTT DODSON*

I. Introduction

Few constitutional doctrines have had as turbulent a history as state
sovereign immunity. 1 Sovereign immunity, the right of a sovereign to refuse
to appear as a defendant in court, 2 has been described at various times as an
assumed part of civilized nations, 3 a common law doctrine that Congress may
abrogate, 4 a constitutional doctrine grounded in the Eleventh Amendment, 5
and a constitutional doctrine inhering in the structure of the original
Constitution. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on sovereign immunity
have been overruled by subsequent decisions 7 and by constitutional

* Adjunct Professor, The George Washington University Law School (2003-2004);
Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP. The views expressed herein are mine and do not
necessarily represent those of any other individual or entity. I thank Jeff Powell, Professor of
Law and Divinity at Duke University, for his insight and comments.
1. See Scott Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 393, 393-95 & 395 n.8
(2003) (citing authorities calling the doctrine "erratic" and "protean") [hereinafter Dodson,
Vectoral Federalism]; Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State Sovereign Immunity, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721, 723 (2002) (characterizing it as a "bizarre quagmire") [hereinafter
Dodson, Metes and Bounds].
2. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890).
3. See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857) ("It is an established
principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own
courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission .... ").
4. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 17-23 (1989), ove"uled by Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
5. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,54 (1996).
6. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
7. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
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amendment. 8 There can be no gainsaying that the doctrine has lacked stability
and coherence.
Perhaps because of this instability the Court has, until recently, avoided a
full explanation of the reason for immunizing states from certain suits. 9 But
in the 2002 decision Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State
Ports Authority, 10 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor, made explicit what the Court had
only suggested in previous decisions: 11
The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord
States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign
entities. "The founding generation thought it 'neither becoming
nor convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with
that large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated
to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer
the complaints of private persons. "' 12
Though this forceful pronouncement has clarity, a sorely needed attribute
for this particular doctrine, the dignity rationale itself lacks substantial
justification and is untethered to any limiting principles save those locked
inside the minds of five Justices. Given that, where does this "dignity
rationale" for state sovereign immunity logically lead? How far might it be
expanded? Does dignity help unify or confound a more coherent view of state
sovereign immunity? Will its sudden acceptance in the sovereign immunity
jurisprudence lead to application in other state sovereignty doctrines? This
Article hazards answers to these and other questions.

8. The Eleventh Amendment overruled Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
9. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 257 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "the doctrine lacks ... a clear rationale"); United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 207 (1882) (asserting that "the principle has never been discussed or the reasons for
it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine").
10. 535 u.s. 743 (2002).
11. See infra Part II.E.
12. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748
(1989)) (citation omitted); accord id. at 752 (explaining that the sovereign states "did not
consent to become mere appendages of the Federal Government"); id. at 760 ("Simply put, if
the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State's dignity to be required to answer the
complaints of private parties in federal courts, we cannot imagine that they would have found
it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same thing before the administrative tribunal
of an agency, such as the FMC .... The affront to a State's dignity does not lessen when an
adjudication takes place in an administrative tribunal as opposed to an Article ill court. In both
instances, a State is required to defend itself in an adversarial proceeding against a private party
before an impartial federal officer.") (citations omitted).
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The Court's intensifying focus on dignity before Federal Maritime had not
gone unnoticed. 13 Commentators have explored where the Court unearthed
the idea of state dignity, 14 why the Court is employing it, 15 and, if it is to be
used, what form it should take. 16 This Article concerns not so much the
where, why, or how of the dignity rationale, 17 but rather what effects that
rationale has on existing doctrine. As demonstrated below, those effects are
monumental: for better or for worse, the dignity rationale not only changes the
state sovereign immunity landscape, but also has widespread implications for
the revival of state regulatory immunity and support for the
anticommandeering doctrine.
Part II of this Article surveys the development of the dignity rationale in
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence and concludes that the dignity
rationale lacks solid grounding principles. Part ill analyzes what effects the
sudden acceptance of the dignity rationale may have on state sovereign
immunity and reasons that the dignity rationale's abdication of textual
faithfulness has at least the potential for a flexibility beneficial to doctrinal
coherence. Finally, Part N takes a preliminary look at the future of state
sovereignty doctrines as informed by the adoption of the dignity rationale and
predicts that these related doctrines may be profoundly affected by the dignity
rationale.

13. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court's New
Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 245 (2000); Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State
Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 81 (2001) [hereinafter Caminker, Judicial
Solicitude]; Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the
New Federalism, 15 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133 (2000); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk,
Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1921 (2003); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 15 NOTREDAMEL. REV.
1121 (2000); Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1 (2003).
14. See Smith, supra note 13, at 6-7 (arguing that the Court's invocation of dignity
demonstrates the Court's importation of foreign sovereign immunity principles into state
sovereign immunity doctrine).
15. See Caminker, Judicial Solicitude, supra note 13, at 83 (suggesting that the notion
might be merely "rhetorical window dressing"); id. at 84-91 (suggesting that dignity might be
an intrinsic or instrumental expressive norm).
16. See Resnik & Suk, supra note 13, at 1954-55 (suggesting that sovereign dignity has a
role in institutional structure, but not as a source for civil immunity).
17. As Professor Smith admits, the "where" or "why" questions may be quite difficult to
answer. See Smith, supra note 13, at 32 (asserting that "the Court's current view ofthe origins
of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity ... is ... generally ambivalent and cryptically
expressed"); id. at 77-78 ("It is, of course, impossible to know precisely what the Court intends
when it relies on the concept of state dignity in the state sovereign immunity cases.").
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II. Development of the Dignity Rationale
Although only recently assuming a predominant stature, dignity has played
a role in sovereign immunity throughout its history. This Part recounts the
development of the dignity rationale.

A. Origins
Some have suggested that, in logical terms, the availability of sovereign
immunity depends on at least two factors: the source of law and the forum.
The absolute font of the law cannot logically be compelled by the law
against his will, so the argument goes, for as creator, his refusal to abide by
the law creates a legal exception for himself. 18 Likewise, if the font of
justice refuses to be sued in his own courts, regardless of the source of the
substantive law, he creates an exception from suit for himself in that
particular forum. 19
Others have suggested that sovereign immunity may be justified by
normative considerations focusing on the nature of the parties and the remedy
sought. Sovereign immunity might be desirable, for example, to free a ruler
from the nuisances of litigation or to protect his dignity as a sovereign. 20
Unlike the logical rationales, the practical justifications are subject to far more
malleable standards.

18. See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends."); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 184 (Richard Tucked., Cambridge
University Press 1991) (1651) ("The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly or one
Man, is not Subject to the Civil Lawes. For having power to make, and repeal Lawes, he may
when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, by repealing those Lawes that trouble him,
and making of new; and consequently he was free before."). But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 97-98 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing this logic).
19. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979).
20. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226 (1882) (Gray, J., dissenting) (defending
sovereign immunity for the United States as "essential to the common defence and general
welfare"); Briggs v. Light-Boats, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157, 162 (1865) ("[T]he broader reason
is, that it would be inconsistent with the very idea of supreme executive power, and would
endanger the performance of the public duties of the sovereign, to subject him to repeated suits
as a matter of right, at the will of any citizen, and to submit to the judicial tribunals the control
and disposition ofhis public property, his instruments and means of carrying on the government
in war and peace, and the money in his treasury.").
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In Britain, 21 because the king was supreme, sovereign immunity derived
foremost from the two logical justifications. As the font of the law, the king
could do no wrong, 22 and, as the highest authority of justice, he could not be
ordered by the courts against his will. 23 Lower governmental bodies and
officers were not entitled to the same immunity. 24
When he so chose, the king found room to temper his immunity. Under the
Saxons, the king opened his court to all plaintiffs to pursue various remedial
writs, even against the king himself. 25 In cases of suits on a debt owed by the
crown, the subject could not sue but could petition for redress. 26 Although the

21. It is unnecessary to review the ancient history of sovereign immunity, which has its
origins in medieval times. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY 5 (1972) ("At least as early as the thirteenth century, during the reign of Henry ill
(1216-1272), it was recognized that the king could not be sued in his own courts."); Louis Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1963)
("By the time of Bracton (1268) it was settled doctrine that the King could not be sued eo
nomine in his own courts.").
22. See 1 WIWAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *244-*46. It has been argued that this
axiom originally meant that the sovereign was not permitted to do wrong, rather than was not
held accountable for acts otherwise deemed wrongful. See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and
Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1972); Jaffe,
supra note 21, at 4. Others have suggested that the phrase meant that the wrongful acts of the
crown would be attributed to the king's subordinates and not to the king. See Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTREDAMEL. REv. 859, 866 (2000). Still
others have reconciled it with the petition of right mentioned below. See John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
1889, 1896 (1983) ("Thus, the true meaning of the English expression 'the king can do no
wrong' was that the king would do no wrong, for if he did, the petition of right would set
wrongs right.").
23. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 103 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he King or Crown, as
the font of justice, is not subject to suit in its own courts."); Hall, 440 U.S. at 414-15
(explaining sovereign immunity on the basis that no tribunal could be higher than the King); 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, *241-*42 ("[T]he law ascribes to the king the attribute of
sovereignty, or pre-eminence .... Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the
king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction
implies superiority of power ....").
24. See Gibbons, supra note 22, at 1895-97; Jaffe, supra note 21, at 1.
25. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,460 (1793); Banker's Case, 14 Howell's
State Trials 1 (1700); Jaffe, supra note 21, at 2-5.
26. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 440 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("[I]n cases of debts owing
by the crown, the subject's remedy was by Petition ...."); id. at 445 (Iredell, J., dissenting)
("Thus, it appears, that in England even in case of a private debt contracted by the King, in his
own person, there is no remedy but by petition, which must receive his express sanction,
otherwise there can be no proceeding upon it.").
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crown's submission to the petition was a matter of grace, 27 the crown, for
practical reasons, rarely refused a valid petition. 28
There lingered, however, a concern for sovereign dignity outside of the
logical justifications. 29 According to Blackstone,
[l]t is necessary to distinguish the prince from his subjects ....
The law therefore ascribes to the king . . . certain attributes of a
great and transcendent nature; by which the people are led to
consider him in the light of a superior being, and to pay him that
awful respect, which may enable him with greater ease to carry on
the business of government. This is what I understand by the royal
30
. .
dtgmty ....
The form of the petition of right, a petition that the king could deny at whim
(in theory, if not in practice), conveyed somewhat more respect and deference
to the sovereign than a compulsory lawsuit in court. 31 Under British rule,
then, sovereign dignity played only the role of undercurrent, certainly not the
primary consideration the Supreme Court has adopted for the American states.
B. Independence and the Articles of Confederation

The colonists rejected the underlying principles of the logical justifications
when they declared their independence. The Declaration of Independence
27. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *243 ("[I]f any person has, in point of property,
a just demand upon the king, he must petition him in his court of chancery, where his chancellor
will administer right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion."); see also 3 id. at *256*57.
28. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882) (noting that the petition of right
"has been as efficient in securing the rights of suitors against the crown in all cases appropriate
to judicial proceedings, as that which the law affords to the subjects of the King in legal
controversies among themselves"); Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)("1n
Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to
comply with the judgment of his court."); Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 460 (''True it is, that
now in England the King must be sued in his Courts by Petition; but even now, the difference
is only in the form, not in the thing. The judgments or decrees of those Courts will substantially
be the same upon a precatory as upon a mandatory process."); Gibbons, supra note 22, at 1896
("[B]y the eighteenth century, the petition of right, the writ by which suit could be brought
against the monarch, was entertained routinely, and thus had become for all practical purposes
nondiscretionary.").
29. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,96 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining
that in England "it might have been unseemly to allow a commoner to hale the monarch into
court").
30. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *241.
31. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 452 ("When sovereigns are sued in their own Courts,
such a method [as the petition] may have been established as the most respectful form of
demand .... ").
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itself denied the absolute sovereignty of the government and placed the
legitimate exercise of government power in the "consent of the governed." 32
Independence undermined the logical justifications for sovereign immunity in
the new states. 33
What logic does not require, tradition may support, and despite their break
from British rule, the colonists returned to British models when they
considered the genesis of American government. 34 They did not adopt the
British traditions wholesale, however, 35 so it is important to look at the
transition from British rule to independence critically. Under British notions
of sovereign immunity, only the king was protected, not his subjects or the
local charters. 36 As expected, those charters that mentioned suits against the
colonial governors or corporate bodies permitted suits by private individuals. 37
32. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
33. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 n.24 (1997) ("Although we have adopted the
related doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common-law fiction that [the King can do no
wrong] was rejected at the birth of the Republic.") (citation omitted).
34. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,205 (1882) (surmising that the doctrine "is derived
from the laws and practices of our English ancestors").
35. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829) ("The common law of
England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with
them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and
adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation."); Akhil Reed Amar,
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, The Supreme Court 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L.
REv. 26, 115 (2000) (explaining that the Framers broke with English tradition in a variety of
ways, including English understanding of sovereignty).
36. See supra text accompanying note 24.
37. The fust Massachusetts Charter established an executive council that could be sued in
"all Manner of Courts and Places that now are, or hereafter shall be, within this our Realme and
elsewhere, as well temporal as spiritual, in all Manner of Suits and Matters whatsoever, and of
what Nature or Kinde soever such Suite or Action be or shall be." THE CHARTER OF NEW
ENGLAND (1620), reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OFUNITEDSTATES CONSTITUTIONS
16, 19 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975) [hereinafter SOURCES]. The First Charter of
Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut's Charter of 1662, the Rhode Island Charter of 1663, and
Georgia's Charter of 1732 followed with similar authorizations of suits against their Governors
and corporate bodies. See CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1629), reprinted in 5 SOURCES,
supra, at 32, 36; CHARTER OF 1662, reprinted in 2 SOURCES, supra, at 131; CHARTER OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663), reprinted in 8 SOURCES, supra, at 362, 363;
CHARTER OF 1732, reprinted in 2 SOURCES, supra, at 433, 434. New Hampshire's Charter of
1689 provided jurisdiction over suits between parties "or between us and any of our subjects
there." Cutt's Commission, reprinted in 6 SOURCES, supra, at 321, 324. The charters of
Virginia, New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania were silent with respect to suits against
officials or corporate bodies. See CHARTER OF 1606, reprinted in 10 SOURCES, supra, at 17;
CHARTER OFJUNE20, 1632, reprinted in 4 SOURCES, supra, at 350; CHARTER OF 1681, reprinted
in 8 SOURCES, supra, at 243; DUKEOFYORK'SCHARTER (1683), reprinted in 7 SOURCES, supra,
at 161.
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Independence, however, brought to the states the potential for full
sovereignty. The people recalled their sovereignty and granted it to the state
legislatures through their new constitutions. 38 In the process, the people could
have granted their states the same sovereign immunity as provided for the
king. They did not.
American leaders were but men, servants of the people and entitled to
dignity and respect not from titles or privileges, but from their own inherent
worth. 39 Accordingly, the first state constitutions exhibited the same tendency
for permitting suits against the state as did the British charters. Connecticut
and Rhode Island simply adopted their existing charters as state constitutions,
each of which permitted state suability. 4° For those states that did not adopt
an express declaration of their own suability, most adopted protective bills of
rights, which were designed to ensure governmental accountability to the
citizenry and provided that remedies be afforded for injuries. 41
That some states adopted provisions of suability may suggest that the states
recognized that they possessed sovereign immunity but voluntarily waived it,
much as the king did through the petition of right. The states would have no
need to adopt express provisions if they had no immunity in the first place.
If that is what happened, however, it certainly contradicts the dignity rationale.
Unlike the king' s petition of right, which grew out of custom and practical
concerns and was designed with the appropriate respect for sovereign dignity,
there is no indication that the states adopted similar mechanisms for suability
grounded in the same concerns or that fostered the same kind of dignity or
respect. Throwing state suits indiscriminately in with the rest of the lawsuits
hardly seems founded on concerns for state dignity.
Perhaps more telling than the applicable textual references of the time42 was
what was brewing in the minds of the recently liberated and prospective rulers
of a fledgling nation. The new Americans rejected that last remnant of British
kingliness, royal dignity. While "it might have been unseemly to allow a
commoner to hale the monarch into court" in Britain, the revolutionaries were
building the fundamental principle that the people are more sovereign than the

38. See GoRDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OFTHEAMERICAN REPUBUC 1776-1787, at 35260 (1969).
39. See id. at 66-67.
40. See CONSTITUTIONAL ORDINANCE OF 1776, reprinted in 2 SOURCES, supra note 37, at
143; Background Note: Rhode Island Constitutions, 8 SOURCES, supra note 37, at 351-52.
41. See Gibbons, supra note 22, at 1898.
42. The Articles of Confederation shed little extra light on the subject of state suability,
except to provide that disputes between states and disputes regarding the private ownership of
land granted by two different states could be appealed to the national Congress. See ARTICLES
OFCONFEDERATION art. 9 (U.S. 1778).
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govemment. 43 They feared that where a state assumed a "supercilious
preeminence above the people [with] haughty notions of state independence,
state sovereignty and state supremacy . . . man is degraded from the prime
rank, which he ought to hold in human affairs .... " 44 Sovereign dignity was
rejected by the radical Whig notions held by the revolutionaries 45 and became
even more antithetical to Americans as they viewed their own state
governments with growing suspicion and mistrust. 46
Although the visionaries of the New World rejected the underpinnings of
royal dignity,47 sovereign immunity, in some form, persisted. In Nathan v.
43. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,208-09 (1882); THEFEDERAUSTNO. 22, at 152 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961) (stating that the people are "that pure, original fountain
of all legitimate authority"); THE FEDERAUSTNO. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (''The federal and State Governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of
the people .... [T]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the
people alone .... "); THE FEDERAUST No. 49, at 313 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[T]he people are the only legitimate fountain of power .... ").
44. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 461 (1793).
45. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Royal
dignity is] inimical to [republicanism], which rests on the understanding ... that the government
is not above [the people] but of [and subject to] them."); Caminker, Judicial Solicitude, supra
note 13, at 86-87; Smith, supra note 13, at 29.
46. See WOOD, supra note 38, at 404-10, 463-65; THE FEDERAUST No. 15, at 73-74
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (lambasting the states for their foibles,
ineptitude, and recalcitrance).
47. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 208-09. According to the Lee Court,
Notwithstanding the progress which has been made since the days of the Stuarts
in stripping the crown of its powers and prerogatives, it remains true to-day that
the monarch is looked upon with too much reverence to be subjected to the
demands of the law as ordinary persons are, and the king-loving nation would be
shocked at the spectacle of their Queen being turned out of her pleasure-garden
by a writ of ejectment against the gardener. The crown remains the fountain of
honor, and the surroundings which give dignity and majesty to its possessor are
cherished and enforced all the more strictly because of the loss of real power in the
government.
It is not to be expected, therefore, that the courts will permit their process to
disturb the possession of the crown by acting on its officers or agents.
Under our system the people, who are there called subjects, are the sovereign.
Their rights, whether collective or individual, are not bound to give way to a
sentiment of loyalty to the person of a monarch. The citizen here knows no
person, however near to those in power, or however powerful himself, to whom
he need yield the rights which the law secures to him when it is well administered.
When he, in one of the courts of competent jurisdiction, has established his right
to property, there is no reason why deference to any person, natural or artificial,
not even the United States, should prevent him from using the means which the
law gives him for the protection and enforcement of that right.
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Virginia, 48 a private individual obtained a writ of attachment against the
Commonwealth of Virginia and sued in Pennsylvania state court for
enforcement.49 The Pennsylvania court dismissed the suit without opinion, but
a note appended to the dismissal revealed that

[t]he true ground of this decision is, that a sovereign state is not
suable in the municipal courts of another jurisdiction, and a foreign
attachment is but a mode of compelling an appearance. Whilst the
states have surrendered certain powers to the general government,
they have not divested themselves of the attribute of state
sovereignty. 50
With the logical grounds compelling state sovereignty and the royal-dignity
ground of British hierarchy rejected, this remaining attachment to sovereign
immunity is quite curious. It may have been founded on blind adherence to
British tradition, on imported values from the laws of nations, 5 1 on practical
considerations, or on the belief that the citizens of Virginia elected to retain
sovereign immunity for their state. 52 Whatever limited dignity Nathan may
represent, if any, it is certainly insufficient to overcome the weight of
contemporary evidence rejecting sovereign dignity.
C. State Sovereign Immunity and the Constitution

Although the degree of sovereign immunity that the states enjoyed prior to
the Constitution is unclear, ratification of the Constitution fixed sovereign
immunity for the states. Determining exactly what the Constitution fixed,
however, is a difficult question. The answer starts with Article ill of the
Constitution, which extends federal "judicial Power" to controversies

/d.

48. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 8ln.* (Pa. 1781).
49. /d. at 8ln*.
50. William A. Fletcher,A Historicallnterpretation ofthe Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affinnative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1075 (1983) [hereinafter Fletcher, Historical
Interpretation].
51. See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
HARv. L. REv. 1559, 1577-79 (2002); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's
Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REv. 555, 586-87 (1994).
52. Lee, 106 U.S. at 206 ("As no person in this government exercises supreme executive
power, or performs the public duties of a sovereign, it is difficult to see on what solid foundation
of principle the exemption from liability to suit rests. It seems most probable that it has been
adopted in our courts as a part of the general doctrine of publicists, that the supreme power in
every State, wherever it may reside, shall not be compelled, by process of courts of its own
creation, to defend itself from assaults in those courts.").
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"between a State and Citizens of another State."53 By its terms, the Diversity
Clause does not differentiate between a plaintiff state and a defendant state,
lending support to the majority of the founding era luminaries' interpretation
of the clause as expressly permitting private suits against unconsenting
states. 54
State dignity and respect became a battle cry for Article ill dissidents.
Brutus, a leading Antifederalist, called Article ill "improper, because it
subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of an individual. This
is humiliating and degrading to a government, and, what I believe, the
supreme authority of no state ever submitted to." 55 The Federal Farmer
questioned the propriety of Article ill so "humbl[ing] a state, as to bring it to
answer to an individual in a court of law."56 In Virginia, George Mason
maligned the Constitution for enabling
claim[s] against this state [to] be tried before the federal court. Is
not this disgraceful? Is this state to be brought to the bar of justice
like a delinquent individual? Is the sovereignty of the state to be
arraigned like a culprit, or private offender? Will the states
undergo this mortification?57
State respect and dignity became a tidal wave that only a few radical
nationalists stood against. 58 Some attempted to ameliorate the state
53. U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2, cl. 1. The full text of the Section states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; -to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls; -to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; -to Controversies
between two or more States; -between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

/d.
54. See Dodson, Metes and Bounds, supra note 1, at 728 n.33 (citing statements).
55. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAUST 429 (Brutus) (Storing ed., 1981).
56. 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIACATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 41-42
(Federal Farmer) (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
57. 3 JONATHAN EWOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 526-27 (George Mason) (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter
EWOT'S DEBATES].
58. See id. at 207 (Edmund Randolph) ("I admire that part [of the Constitution] which
forces Virginia to pay her debts."); 2 id. at 491 (James Wilson) ("When a citizen has a
controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may stand on a
just and equal footing."). Not all anti-Federalists criticized Article ill on dignity grounds.
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sentimentalists by asserting that sovereign dignity would exempt states from
Article msuits. 59 Without any apparent resolution to the question of whether
notions of state dignity would overcome the text of Article m, the states
adopted and ratified the Constitution.
The vehemence with which ratification debaters advocated state dignity
supports a reading of the Constitution that, where appropriate, respects state
dignity. 60 One rationale for naming the state first in the Diversity Clause
might have been respect for state dignity. 61 Indeed, Article m bestows the
Supreme Court with original jurisdiction to hear controversies involving a
state or an ambassador62 to "match[] the dignity of the parties to the status of
the court. " 63
Despite the propriety of interpreting the Constitution with a healthy respect
for state dignity, its language, structure, and historical record indicate that the
push for recognition of state dignity did not succeed in express
constitutionalization. 64 In stark contrast to the Articles of Confederation,65 the
Concern for the integrity of vulnerable state treasuries was also an important factor. See
Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 50, at 1047-48.
59. See, e.g., THEFEDERAUSTNO. 39, at245 (JamesMadison)(ClintonRossitered., 1961)
(asserting that the states retained a "residuary and inviolable sovereignty"); THE FEDERAUST
No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It is inherent in the nature
of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.").
60. Others have reached similar conclusions. See Resnik & Suk, supra note 13, at 1954-55.
61. Though I have found no preratification evidence of this justification for the ordering,
Justice John Blair surmised it in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,45051 (1793), in which he opined that "probably the State was fust named, in respect to the dignity
of a State").
62. See U.S. CONST. art. ill,§ 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction.").
63. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59,66 (1979); accordTHEFEDERAUST No. 81, supra
note 59, at 487 ("In cases in which a State might happen to be a party, it would ill suit its dignity
to be turned over to an inferior tribunal."). Of course, Congress has decided whether this
original jurisdiction is exclusive or nonexclusive. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000) (conferring
exclusive original jurisdiction over controversies between two or more states but nonexclusive
original jurisdiction over other controversies); cf United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643
( 1892) ("Such exclusive jurisdiction was given to this court, because it best comported with the
dignity of a State, that a case in which it was a party should be determined in the highest, rather
than in a subordinate judicial tribunal of the nation."). For commentary on the Original
Jurisdiction Clause's embodiment of respect for state dignity, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The History
and Structure of Article Ill, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569, 1598 (1990).
64. The Constitution certainly left intact a "residuary and inviolable" state sovereignty over
matters not withheld from them by the Constitution or given to the federal government. THE
FEDERAUST No. 39, supra note 59, at 245. "Residuary" effects- that is, what the Constitution
did not affect - are not the same as affirmative inroads into or defenses to federal power.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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Constitution does not even mention state "sovereignty," 66 the purported source
of state dignity, much less state dignity itself. 67 The very limited nature of
federal powers leaves a wide range of sovereign authority for the states, and
the Constitution clearly assumes the continued existence of the states as quasiindependent govemments. 68 However, the most that can be inferred from this
structure is that the Constitution prohibits any federal intrusion into state
affairs that destroys the governmental character of the states. 69 The
Constitution's implicit recognition of residual and perpetual state sovereignty
does not translate to an expansive extratextuallimitation on the ability of the
federal power to subject the states to its will.
This recognition is not without historical reason, particularly with respect
to suits against states. The Framers knew that a crucial failure of the Articles
of Confederation was the inability to force the states to abide by national
obligations set by Congress for the safety of the nation. 70 The Treaty of Paris,
for example, which ended the war for independence, "imposed two obligations
on the British: to evacuate all military posts within American territory, and to
leave behind all slaves.'m Further, the treaty imposed one principal obligation

66. See Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) ("The
Constitution nowhere contains direct language referring to state authority as sovereign in any
way."); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 HARV. L. REv. 2180,2215 (1998) (observing that states' rights do not clearly appear in the
Constitution's text); Jean Yarbrough, Federalism and Rights in the American Founding, in
FEDERAliSM AND RIGHTS 57, 64 (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1996) (explaining that the
Constitution does not empower states with anything "inviolable" and instead constrains state
power).
67. Perhaps the soundest affirmative evidence of the rejection of British notions of dignity
is the prohibition on titles of nobility. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility
shall be granted by the United States .... ").
68. See Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, supra note 1, at 402-04.
69. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) (observing that "neither
government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its
powers"); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868), overruled in part by Morgan v.
United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885) ("[T]he preservation of the States, and the maintenance of
their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the
preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution,
in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States [with
separate and independent existence]."); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71,77 (1868)
("[T]he people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with
all the functions essential to separate and independent existence .... [l]n many articles of the
Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the
independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized.").
70. See THE FEDERAUST No. 15, supra note 46, at 73-80.
71. Gibbons, supra note 22, at 1900.
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on the United States: to honor all debts owed to British creditors. 72 The
northern states honored their debts for the most part, but the impoverished
southern states resisted. 73 At the same time, the British manumitted thousands
of blacks when evacuating the Atlantic posts and refused to evacuate the
northern posts. 74 The continued recalcitrance of the southern states provided
an excuse for the British to maintain the northern posts, a source of
embarrassment for the new nation. 75
It was widely recognized that the stalemate needed a national solution
unavailable under the rather toothless Articles. 76 In the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, James Wilson defended Article ill of the Constitution as
necessary to enforce the Treaty of Paris against the petulant southern states. 77
In the New York debates, Alexander Hamilton used the anti-Federalists' ideas
against them by arguing that the state violations of the treaty offended the
dignity of the United States. 78 In North Carolina, James Iredell stated that
without Article ill, Congress could not "compel the observance of treaties that
they make." 79 And in Virginia, Edmund Randolph worried that continued
state resistance to treaty obligations would lead to war. 80 Given this evidence,
it is extremely unlikely that respect for state dignity rose to the level of an
inherent limitation on Article m suits against states.
Whether these arguments persuaded the states is another matter. One can
infer, however, that at least some of the states ratified the Constitution
72. See id. at 1901.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1900.
75. See id. at 1902.
76. See id.
77. See 2 ElliOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 490 (James Wilson) (stating that Article ill
would enable enforcement of the Treaty of Paris against the states and "show the world that we
make the faith of treaties a constitutional part of the character of the United States; that we
secure its performance no longer nominally, for the judges of the United States will be enabled
to carry it into effect, let the legislatures of the different states do what they may").
78. See THE FEDERAUST No. 15, supra note 46, at 156 ("Are we even in a condition to
remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty,
ought to be removed.").
79. 4 ElliOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 146 (James Iredell).
80. 3 id. at 573 (Edmund Randolph) ("If a government refuses to do justice to individuals,
war is the consequence."); see also 14 DOCUMENTARYHISTORY, supra note 56, at 204 (Timothy
Pickering) ("[l]t seems to be a wise provision, which puts it in the power of such foreigners &
citizens to resort to a court where they may reasonably expect to obtain impartial justice....
With respect to foreigners, all the states form but one nation. This nation is responsible for the
conduct of all its members towards foreign nations, their citizens & subjects; and therefore
ought to possess the power of doing justice to the latter. Without this power, a single state, or
one of its citizens, might embroil the whole union in a foreign war.").
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believing that state dignity and respect did not exempt them from suits under
Article ill. Immediately after ratification, New York proposed an amendment
to the First Congress, which stated that "nothing in the Constitution now under
consideration contained, is to be construed to authorize any suit to be brought
against any state, in any manner whatever.'' 81 Virginia and North Carolina
proposed amendments which would have eliminated both diversity and federal
question jurisdiction. 82 Rhode Island proposed an amendment to eliminate
state-citizen jurisdiction, specifically suits concerning payment of state-issued
public securities. 83 Massachusetts proposed an amendment objecting to "the
states [being] made subject to the action of an individual.'' 84 Had these states
believed they were exempt from individual suits under the Constitution, there
would have been no reason for them to propose such amendments.
The First Congress did not consider any of these proposals. During the first
session, South Carolina Representative Thomas Tudor Tucker proposed an
amendment that would have eliminated the Diversity Clause from Article ill;
however, the amendment was not referred to the House floor. 85 Instead,
Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided for circuit court
jurisdiction over cases in which "an alien is a party" 86 and gave the Supreme
Court exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions "where a state is a party, except
between a state and its citizens, and except also between a state and citizens
of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction.''87
Congress adopted other amendments, however, and one pertains to state
sovereign immunity. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states or the
people those "powers not delegated" to the federal government. 88 Though
seemingly an innocuous tautology, 89 one might still argue that the reservation

81. 2 EWOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 409.
82. 3 id. at 660-61 (Va.); 4 id. at 246 (N.C.).
83. William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply
to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1261, 1267 & n.28 (1989).
84. Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 50, at 1052 (alteration in original).
85. 1 ANNAlSOFCONG. 791 (JosephGalesed., 1789).
86. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
87. /d. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
89. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (''The amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national
and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment ...."). But see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 270-74 (1983) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Framers originally intended the enumerated powers to be
constrained by principles of state sovereignty).

792

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:777

of powers is the reservation of sovereign powers which necessarily includes
attendant rights and attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign dignity.
The history of the Tenth Amendment belies that theory. Its predecessor in
the Articles of Confederation clarified that "[e]ach state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and
right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United
States in Congress assembled." 90 By contrast, the Tenth Amendment reserves
only "powers" to the states (and even then to be shared by the people); state
sovereignty, freedom, independence, jurisdiction, and rights failed to make the
cut. 91 The Tenth Amendment, therefore, cannot alone support state sovereign
immunity or sovereign dignity. 92
The historical record suggests that state sovereign dignity was a topic of
fervent debate and that it was accepted to some degree. The same record also
indicates, however, that such acceptance did not lead to the adoption of an
implied constitutional limitation on Article III based on state dignity.
D. Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment

The controversy surrounding the meaning of state dignity and Article III
rose to the Supreme Court quickly. In 1793, the Court decided Chisholm v.
Georgia, 93 an original suit in assumpsit in the Supreme Court under state
common law brought by a citizen of South Carolina to recover a debt against
the State of Georgia. 94 The suit clearly fell within the literal language of that
section of Article III establishing federal court jurisdiction over controversies
between a state and citizens of another state. Nevertheless, Georgia argued
that the Court lacked jurisdiction over it as a sovereign state. 95
Georgia did not deign to send a lawyer to argue its case. Chisholm,
however, sent Edmund Randolph, U.S. Attorney General and drafter of Article
III, who argued along the same lines he had argued in the ratification debates:

90. ARTIClES OF CONFEDERATION art. 2 (U.S. 1780).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
92. The Justices agree that state sovereign immunity is not rooted in the Tenth Amendment.
See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,767 n.18 (2002) (''The principle
of state sovereign immunity enshrined in our constitutional framework, however, is not rooted
in the Tenth Amendment."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,761 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(''There is no evidence that the Tenth Amendment constitutionalized a concept of sovereign
immunity as inherent in the notion of statehood.").
93. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
94. /d. at 420.
95. See Smith, supra note 13, at 52 & n.222.
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immunity was contrary to popular sovereignty96 and would breed war. 97
Randolph also stated, in a new (and perhaps necessary) response to the dignity
proponents, that a suit in federal court was not a degradation of sovereignty
because the federal government was of a higher authority than the state. 98
The Court agreed with Randolph. Justice Blair, looking to the
Constitution's text, inferred its acceptance of state sovereign dignity, 99 but
rejected the notion that dignity limited the plain language of Article ill. 100 He
also noted that the Constitution's purpose was to unify the nation, and
immunity from foreign plaintiffs would, by permitting a state to "withhold[]
justice," enable it "to embroil the whole confederacy in disputes of another
nature." 101 Blair concluded that states gave up immunity to suits in federal
courts by ratifying the Constitution. 102
Justice Wilson attacked the underlying principles supporting British
sovereign immunity. The king could not be sued because he was the supreme
power, and submission to jurisdiction implies inferiority. 103 In America,

96. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 422-23.
97. ld. at 423-24 ("If a State shall injure an individual of another State, the latter must
protect him by a remonstrance. What if this be ineffectual? To stop there would cancel his
allegiance; one State cannot sue another for such a cause; acquiescence is not to be believed.
The crest of war is next raised; the Federal head cannot remain unmoved amidst these shocks
to the public harmony. Ought then a necessity to be created for drawing out the general force
on an occasion to replete with horror? Is not an adjustment by a judicial form far preferable?
Are not peace and concord among the States two of the great ends of the Constitution?").
98. See id. at 425 ("I hold it, therefore, to be no degradation of sovereignty, in the States,
to submit to the Supreme Judiciary of the United States. At the same time, by way of
anticipating an objection, I assert, that it will not follow, from these premises, that the United
States themselves may be sued. For the head of a confederacy is not within the reach of the
judicial authorities of its inferior members. It is exempted by its peculiar pre-eminencies.").
99. See id. at 450-51 (opining that "probably the State was first named [in the Diversity
Clause], in respect to the dignity of a State"); id. at 453 (suggesting that entering default
judgment against a state would be "too incompatible with the dignity of a State").
100. See id. ("But that very dignity seems to have been thought a sufficient reason for
confining the sense to the case where a State is plaintiff. It is, however, a sufficient answer to
say, that our Constitution most certainly contemplates, in another banch [sic] of the cases
enumerated, the maintaining a jurisdiction against a State, as Defendant; this is unequivocally
asserted when the judicial power of the United States is extended to controversies between two
or more States; for there, a State must, of necessity, be a Defendant. It is extended also, to
controversies between a State and foreign States ....").
101. /d. at 451.
102. See id. at 452 ("[I]f sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other than the
sovereign's own Courts, it follows that when a State, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed
to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her
right of sovereignty.").
103. See id. at 458.
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however, the people are supreme. 104 Though "certainly respectable," 105 the
states are inferior to their citizens; 106 thus, granting a state immunity from
private suit would actually insult the superior party. 107
Justice Cushing stuck closely to the Constitution, noting that if state
sovereignty was the source for immunity from suit, then the clause authorizing
jurisdiction over suits between states was anomalous. 108 Cushing also
grounded his conclusion on practical concerns of union stability and
fairness. 109 Regarding the concerns that suit would diminish sovereignty,
Cushing responded that the Constitution diminishes state sovereignty in
numerous ways. 110

104. See id. at 457 ("[T]he Supreme Power resides in the body of the people.").
105. /d. at 453.
106. See id. at 455 ("A State; useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior
contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance.").
107. See id. at 456 ("A State, like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest State, like a
dishonest merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court of Justice:
Upon general principles of right, shall the former when summoned to answer the fair demands
of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to assume a new appearance, and to insult him and
justice, be declaring I am a Sovereign State? Surely not.").
108. See id. at 467 ("It may be suggested that [Article III] could not be intended to subject
a State to be a Defendant, because it would effect the sovereignty of States. If that be the case,
what shall we do with the immediate preceding clause; 'controversies between two or more
States,' where a State must of necessity be Defendant'? ... For if the judicial power extends to
a controversy between one of the United States and a foreign State, as the clause expresses, one
of them must be Defendant. And then, what becomes of the sovereignty of States as far as suing
affects it?").
109. See id. at 467-68 ("One design of the general Government was ... with safety, by the
States separately. Incident to these powers, and for preventing controversies between foreign
powers or citizens from rising to extremities and to an appeal to the sword, a national tribunal
was necessary, amicably to decide them, and thus ward off such fatal, public calamity. . . . As
controversies between State and State, and between a State and citizens of another State, might
tend gradually to involve States in war and bloodshed, a disinterested civil tribunal was intended
to be instituted to decide such controversies, and preserve peace and friendship. Further; if a
State is entitled to Justice in the Federal Court, against a citizen of another State, why not such
citizen against the State, when the same language equally comprehends both? The rights of
individuals and the justice due to them, are as dear and precious as those of States. Indeed the
latter are founded upon the former; and the great end and object of them must be to secure and
support the rights of individuals, or else vain is Government."); id. at 469 ("As to reasons for
citizens suing a different State, which do not hold equally good for suing the United States; one
may be, that as controversies between a State and citizens of another State, might have a
tendency to involve both States in contest, and perhaps in war, a common umpire to decide such
controversies, may have a tendency to prevent the mischief.").
110. See id. at 468.
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Justice Jay, like Wilson, acknowledged the primacy of sovereignty in the
people, rather than in the states, 111 in distinction from Britain. 112 Jay also
reasoned that the clear jurisdiction over state-state suits implied that no
indignity obtained to the status of defendant. 113 Jurisdiction was also fair
because if one state could sue citizens of another state, those citizens should
be able to sue back. 114
Justice James Iredell dissented on statutory grounds. He conceded that
Congress could subject the states to suit by statute if it wished to do so; 115
however, he concluded that Congress had not chosen to do so with the
Judiciary Act, 116 the jurisdictional statute implementing Article ill and limiting

111. See id. at 470-71.
112. See id. at 471 (''That [English] system contemplates [the King] as being the fountain
of honor and authority; and from his grace and grant derives all franchises, immunities and
privileges; it is easy to perceive that such a sovereign could not be amenable to a Court of
Justice, or subjected to judicial controul and actual constraint. It was of necessity, therefore,
that suability became incompatible with such sovereignty. Besides, the Prince having all the
Executive powers, the judgment of the Courts would, in fact, be only monitory, not mandatory
to him .... No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the
people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country .... "); id. at 472 (''Their Princes have
personal powers, dignities, and pre-eminences, our rulers have none but official; nor do they
partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens.").
113. !d. at 473 ("As one State may sue another State in this Court, it is plain that no
degradation to a State is thought to accompany her appearance in this Court."). Jay further
reasoned that jurisdiction over state-state suits was necessary to stave off physical hostilities.
See id. at 474 ("Each State was obliged to acquiesce in the measure of justice which another
State might yield to her, or to her citizens; and that even in cases where State considerations
were not always favorable to the most exact measure. There was danger that from this source
animosities would in time result; and as the transition from animosities to hostilities was
frequent in the history of independent States, a common tribunal for the termination of
controversies became desirable, from motives both of justice and of policy."); id. at 475
(explaining that jurisdiction extended "because domestic tranquillity requires, that the
contentions of States should be peaceably terminated by a common judicatory; and, because,
in a free country justice ought not to depend on the will of either of the litigants").
114. /d. at 477 ("It would be strange, indeed, that the joint and equal sovereigns of this
country, should, in the very Constitution by which they professed to establish justice, so far
deviate from the plain path of equality and impartiality, as to give to the collective citizens of
one State, a right of suing individual citizens of another State, and yet deny to those citizens a
right of suing them.").
115. See id. at 435-36 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he general Government has a Judicial
Authority in regard to such subjects of controversy, and the Legislature of the United States may
pass all laws necessary to give such Judicial Authority its proper effect. So far as States under
the Constitution can be made legally liable to this authority, so far to be sure they are
subordinate to the authority of the United States, and their individual sovereignty is in this
respect limited.").
116. /d. at 436 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction to that "agreeable to the principles and usages of law." 117 To
determine whether this category excluded suits against states, Iredell returned
to the common law derived from England. 118 He recognized that English
common law prohibited seeking a remedy against the sovereign, 119 and, after
an extensive analysis of the English common law tradition of sovereign
immunity, he inferred that the American states inherited this relic. 12° For
Iredell, state sovereign immunity was alive and incorporated - or, at least,
left unabridged - by the Judiciary Act, and therefore Georgia was not
amenable to suit notwithstanding the constitutional question. 121 In a final
statement, which he admitted to be dictum, 122 Iredell commented:
[M]y present opinion is strongly against any construction of [the
Constitution], which will admit, under any circumstances, a
compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money. I think
every word in the Constitution may have its full effect without
involving this consequence, and that nothing but express words, or
an insurmountable implication (neither of which I consider, can be
found in this case) would authorize the deduction of so high a
power. 123
It is curious that Justice Iredell did not rely on the dignity rationale, for it
would have supported his statutory argument. The Judiciary Act also gave the
Supreme Court nonexclusive jurisdiction over cases between states and

117. See id. at434 (Iredell, J., dissenting). It was not until sometime later that the Court held
the Original Jurisdiction Clause to be self-executing. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
478,492 (1855); see also Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307,313-14 (1810).
118. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435 (Iredell, I., dissenting) (describing the common
law as "a law which I presume is the ground-work of the laws in every State in the Union, and
which I consider, so far as it is applicable to the peculiar circumstances of the country, and
where no special act of Legislation controuls it, to be in force in each State, as it existed in
England, (unaltered by any statute) at the time of the first settlement of the country").
119. See id. (Iredell, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 437-49 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("My opinion being, that even if the Constitution
would admit of the exercise of such a power, a new law is necessary for the purpose, since no
part of the existing law applies, this alone is sufficient to justify my determination in the present
case.").
122. /d. at 450 (Iredell, I., dissenting) (''This opinion I hold, however, with all the reserve
proper for one, which, according to my sentiments in this case, may be deemed in some measure
extra-judicial.").
123. /d. at 449-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting). For a Federalist interpretation of this statement,
see John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793 ), 73
N.C. L. REv. 255 (1994).
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individuals but exclusive jurisdiction over all other cases involving states. 124
If dignity were the primary basis for immunity, then the Act is coherent only
if it does not contemplate private suits against states. For if state-state suits
are permitted only in the highly dignified Supreme Court because only the
Supreme Court should be permitted to pronounce judgment against a state,
why leave to the lower courts suits between states and individuals, which
would permit lower courts to pronounce judgment against a state and in favor
of an individual? Surely the latter would offend a state's dignity far more than
the former. Construing the Act as contemplating only suits in which a state
was a plaintiff resolves the paradox. That Justice Iredell did not make this
argument suggests that even he did not consider the dignity rationale of
primary importance.
Chisholm was not met with much applause. The day after the Court issued
its decision, Massachusetts Representative Theodore Sedgwick proposed a
constitutional amendment. 125 Another resolution was introduced the following
day, which read nearly identically to the current version. 126
Congress recessed without acting on the proposals; however, in the interim,
Massachusetts and Virginia called for a constitutional convention to consider
the suability of states in federal court. 127 By the time the Third Congress
convened in December, the push for a new convention was before the
legislatures of New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. 128
On January 2, 1794, after Congress reconvened, the Eleventh
Amendment 129 was introduced in the Senate. 130 Senator Gallatin moved to
amend the resolution to exempt "cases arising under treaties made under the
authority of the United States." 131 The Senate rejected the proposal and
124. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 1 Stat. 80, 80 ("[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state
and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which
latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.").
125. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 101 (rev. ed.
1937) (The amendment provided that "no State shall be liable to be made a party defendant in
any of the Judicial Courts established or to be established under the authority of the United
States, at the suit of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners, or of any body politic or
corporate whether within or without the United States.").
126. 3 ANNALS OFCONG. 651-52 (1793).
127. Resolves of Mass. 28 (Sept. 27, 1793); 1793 Va. Acts ch. 52.
128. See JACOBS, supra note 21, at 65-66.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (''The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
130. 4 ANNALS OFCONG. 25 (1794).
131. 4 id. at 30.
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ratified the Amendment 23-2. 132 The Amendment moved to the House, which
ratified it 81-9 on March 4, 1794. 133
Much has been written on the proper interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment. 134 Even those who would construe the Amendment broadly
acknowledge that "the intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers were
ambiguous." 135 For my purposes, I point out only that the amendment seems
to have very little to do with dignity. It does not mention state dignity or even
sovereignty. Its distinction between in-state citizens and out-of-state citizens,
if a true distinction at all, 136 was most likely fashioned out of fiscal
concerns, 137 rather than state dignity. The division between foreign citizens
and foreign nations, if a true distinction, 138 could be supported by dignity it is more degrading for a state to be sued by an individual than by a foreign
sovereign- but is more likely supported by the practicalities of the historical
context. 139
Had the drafters meant to codify a protection of state dignity or sovereignty,
one would expect to see clearer indications - and far broader language - in
the Amendment. For example, the Eleventh Amendment could have read
simply: "No State shall be forced to appear, without its consent, as a defendant
in any controversy brought by an individual." 140 However, the Eleventh
Amendment is not worded so broadly. Rather, the drafters specifically
delineated the parameters of the Amendment by restricting only"[ t]he Judicial
132. !d.
133. 4 id. at 476-78.
134. Compare Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (promoting the diversity theory), and Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note
50, at 1060 (same), and Gibbons, supra note 22 (same), with Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting
the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1342 (1989) (reading the
Amendment literally).
135. Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 484 (1987).
136. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (extending immunity to suits brought by
citizens of the same state).
137. The states were far more concerned about suits by out-of-state creditors than in-state
creditors. See Marshall, supra note 134, at 1363-66.
138. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (extending immunity
to suits brought by foreign nations).
139. State bonds were held by citizens, not foreign nations. See Marshall, supra note 134,
at 1359-60.
140. Reportedly, the first proposed draft of the Eleventh Amendment stated: ''That no state
shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the judicial courts, established, or which
shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons
whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic or corporate,
whether within or without the United States." Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note
50, at 1058-59.
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power of the United States" over a suit "in law or equity" when brought
against a state "by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." 141 No index of intent, such as "Out of respect for State
Sovereignty," leads off the Amendment. Moreover, there is no room for state
waiver of immunity in the Eleventh Amendment, even though waiver
comports with notions of sovereign dignity. 142 Had the Eleventh Amendment
been designed to erect a broad description of state sovereignty or dignity, the
phrasing, though seemingly carefully chosen, would have marked the nadir of
legislative draftsmanship.
The Chisholm opinions, the narrow but precise wording of the Eleventh
Amendment, and the historical context in which it was drafted, make it
unlikely that the Amendment was designed to represent a broad protection for
state sovereign dignity. Nevertheless, the dignity rationale has found a home
by creeping into the opinions of the Supreme Court.
E. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions

The Court has only recently embraced a firm recognition of the inherent
dignity attending state sovereignty. 143 Perhaps the first intonation of the
dignity rationale appeared in United States v. Bright, 144 in which Justice
Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, considered whether the Eleventh
Amendment barred an admiralty proceeding in rem against a state. He noted
the "delicate" issue of a private suit against a state, but stated that because the
Eleventh Amendment did not speak to admiralty and because in rem
proceedings were less "delicate," the court had jurisdiction. 145
Chief Justice John Marshall quickly rejected Justice Washington's
sentiments. In Co hens v. Virginia, 146 the Court held that the appeal of a state
court decision in favor of a plaintiff-state under federal question jurisdiction
was neither prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment nor exempt from Article
ill. 147 In holding the Eleventh Amendment no bar to the appeal, the Court
recalled portions of the Chisholm reasoning:
That [the Amendment's] motive was not to maintain the
sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
142. See infra text accompanying note 274.
143. For a detailed look at varying notions of "dignity" in Supreme Court jurisprudence not
limited to dignity of the states, see Resnik & Suk, supra note 13, at 1933-41.
144. 24F.Cas.1232(C.C.D.Pa.1809)(No.14467),overruiedby/nreNewYork,256U.S.
490, 500 (1921).
145. /d. at 1236.
146. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
147. /d.at417-18.
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compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation, may be
inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not comprehend
controversies between two or more States, or between a State and
a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these
cases: and in these a State may still be sued. We must ascribe the
amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State. 148
For more than half a century after Cohens the dignity rationale lay
decidedly dormant. Through Reconstruction, the Court consistently applied
the Eleventh Amendment narrowly and faithfully to Marshall's view. 149
However, the changing historical times of the Civil War and Reconstruction
eras convinced the Court to adopt a different view of the Eleventh
Amendment.
In 1887, In re Ayers, 150 one of a number of post-Reconstruction southern
bond cases that threatened the financial integrity of the recovering southern
states, 151 queried whether a federal court could hold a state officer in
contempt. The Court stated, directly counter to Cohens:
The very object and purpose of the 11th Amendment were to
prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process
of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties. It was
thought to be neither becoming nor convenient that the several
States of the Union, invested with that large residuum of
sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States,
should be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of
private persons, whether citizens of other States or aliens, or that
the course of their public policy and the administration of their
public affairs should be subject to and controlled by the mandates
of judicial tribunals without their consent, and in favor of
individual interests. 152

148. /d. at 406.
149. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay
on Law, Race, History, and "Federal Courts," 81 N.C. L. REv. 1927, 1940-41 (2003).
150. 123 u.s. 443 (1887).
151. The Civil War, the loss of slave labor, and the depression of the 1870s forced the
southern states into the position of being unable to repay antebellum bond obligations exceeding
$150 million. Purcell, supra note 149, at 1945-46. Facing financial calamity but empowered
by post-Reconstruction political clout, the southern states set a determined course to unilaterally
repudiate their bond obligations. /d. at 1946.
152. Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505.
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Ayers and Cohens collided a few years later in South Dakota v. North
Carolina, 153 in which the Court decided that a state could sue another state for
a debt originally owed a private individual. 154 Despite noting the risk of
subjecting state treasuries to money judgments, 155 the Court held the Eleventh
Amendment inapposite 156 and quoted the anti dignity language from Co hens. 157
In dissent, Justice White quoted the dignity language fromAyers 158 and argued
that the Eleventh Amendment was designed to withdraw all jurisdiction over
suits by individuals against states and that an individual should not be able to
circumvent that state protection simply by selling the debt to a state. 159
South Dakota failed to put the issue of state dignity to rest. In Ex parte
Young·, 160 the Court upheld, in the face of an Eleventh Amendment challenge,
a federal court order enjoining a state officer from attempting to enforce an
unconstitutional state law. 161 The Court did not rest on the English maxim that
only the sovereign, not his officers, are entitled to immunity. 162 Instead, the
Court reasoned that an unconstitutional state law or mandate is without state
authority, and thus the officer acts without state sanction. 163 The officer is
therefore stripped of state authority and acts in his own capacity, without the
protection of state immunity. 164
153. 192 u.s. 286 (1904).
154. /d. at 312.
155. /d. at 319-20 ("[A] treasury, not fenced round or shielded by fixed and established
modes and rules of administration, but which could be subjected to any number or description
of demands, asserted and sustained through the undefined and undefinable discretion of the
courts, would constitute a feeble and inadequate provision for the great and inevitable
necessities of the nation.").
156. /d. at 315 ("It will be perceived that this amendment only granted to a State immunity
from suit by an individual, and did not affect the jurisdiction over controversies between two
or more States.").
157. /d. at 315-16 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,406 (1821)).
158. /d. at 342-43 (White, J., dissenting)(quoting/n re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,504-05 (1887)).
159. /d. at 329-30 (White, J., dissenting).
160. 209 u.s. 123 (1908).
161. /d. at 159-60, 168.
162. See Gibbons, supra note 22, at 1895-96, for a discussion of sovereign immunity in
colonial America.
163. Young, 209 U.S. at 159 ("The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and
if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of
complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State
in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment
which is void because unconstitutional.").
164. /d. at 159-60 ("If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a
violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into
conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
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Justice Harlan dissented, largely in the name of state dignity and in reliance
onAyers. 165 He charged that the Court's new exception
would work a radical change in our governmental system. It would
inaugurate a new era in the American judicial system and in the
relations of theN ational and state governments. It would enable the
subordinate Federal courts to supervise and control the official
action of the States as if they were "dependencies" or provinces. It
would place the States of the Union in a condition of inferiority
never dreamed of when the Constitution was adopted or when the
Eleventh Amendment was made a part of the Supreme Law of the
Land. 166
Justice Harlan noted that states are equally obligated to safeguard federal
rights, and that proper respect for states required that assumption. 167 He was not
particularly perturbed by the possibility that the Supreme Court could hear an
appeal from a state-court suit involving a state, as was the issue in Cohens;
rather, he worried that adjudication in lower federal courts in the ftrst instance
maligned the dignity and respect for the states. 168 But with a minority of votes,
neither Justice Harlan's dissent nor the sentiment of Ayers carried the day.
The Cohens view of state dignity prevailed until 1979, when the Court
decided Nevada v. Hall. 169 Hall held that a state's sovereign immunity from a
official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility
to the supreme authority of the United States.").
165. Id. at 186-90 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (declaring that "the decision in the Ayers case
determines this case for the petitioner").
166. ld. at 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (''Too little consequence has been attached to the fact
that the courts of the States are under an obligation equally strong with that resting upon the
courts of the Union to respect and enforce the provisions of the Federal Constitution as the
Supreme Law of the Land, and to guard rights secured or guaranteed by that instrument. We
must assume- a decent respect for the States requires us to assume- that the state courts will
enforce every right secured by the Constitution.").
168. Id. at 179 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ('That course would have served to determine every
question of constitutional law raised by the suit in the Federal court in an orderly way without
trampling upon the State .... Instead of adopting that course- so manifestly consistent with
the dignity and authority of both the Federal and state judicial tribunals - the Federal court
practically closed the state courts against the State itself when it adjudged that the Attorney
General [was in contempt]."); id. at 182-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Surely, the right of a State
to invoke the jurisdiction of its own courts is not less than the right of individuals to invoke the
jurisdiction of a Federal court. The preservation of the dignity and sovereignty of the States,
within the limits of their constitutional powers, is of the last importance, and vital to the
preservation of our system of government.").
169. 440 u.s. 410 (1979).
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suit brought by an individual in another state's courts is a matter of comity, not
constitutional mandate. 170 "Nevada argue[d] that the Constitution implicitly
establishes a Union in which the States are not free to treat each other as
unfriendly sovereigns, but must respect the sovereignty of one another.'' 171
However, in the absence of a specific constitutional limitation on state
sovereignty, the Court refused to impose a limitation. 172 Such a suit, explained
the Court, "necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second
sovereign." 173 The forum sovereign's acceptance of the second sovereign's
claim of immunity, therefore, rests entirely within its own power, either by
contractual arrangement or "in the voluntary decision of the second to respect
the dignity of the first as a matter of comity." 174 In dissent, Justice Blackmun
chided the majority for failing to give due deference to the sovereignty of a
state. 175 Hall did not focus on the issue of state sovereign dignity but did
implicitly call into question the triumph of Cohens over Ayers in South Dakota
and set the stage for a rematch.
In 1993, the Court decided Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 116 and held the denial of a claim to state sovereign
immunity immediately appealable. 177 The Court revived the dignity language
of Ayers 118 and stated that immunity "accords the States the respect owed them
as members of the federation .... [I]ts ultimate justification is the importance of
ensuring that the States' dignitary interests can be fully vindicated." 179 Justice
Stevens dissented, finding the dignity rationale "embarrassingly insufficient" 180

170. /d. at 425 ("But these provisions do not imply that any one State's immunity from suit
in the courts of another State is anything other than a matter of comity.").
171. /d.at424-25.
172. /d. at 425-26.
173. /d. at416.
174. /d.
175. /d. at 427 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[W]hat we have always thought of as a
'sovereign State' is now to be treated in the courts of a sister State, once jurisdiction is obtained,
just as any other litigant.").
176. 506 u.s. 139 (1993).
177. /d. at 147 ("We hold that States and state entities that claim to be 'arms of the State'
may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order denying a
claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity.").
178. /d. at 146 ('"The very object and purpose of the 11th Amendment were to prevent the
indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of
private parties.'") (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
179. /d.
180. /d. at 151 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to overcome the costs of piecemeal adjudications, 181 but did not elaborate on his
characterization of the dignity rationale.
Metcalf & Eddy is the modern vindication of Ayers over Cohens, and the
Court has not looked back since. In almost every major state sovereign
immunity case since Metcalf & Eddy, the Court has invoked the dignity
rationale, though never, until 2002, making it the focus. In Hess v. Port
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 182 for example, the Court deliberately considered
the effect on state dignity a private suit brought against the Port Authority- a
bistate railway authorized by Congress under the Interstate Compact Clause. 183
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 184 the Court relied in part on the "indignity of
subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of
private parties" 185 in holding Congress powerless under Article I to create federal
private causes of action against states. 186 In Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 187 the
Court reaffmned that the Eleventh Amendment protects a state from suits
instituted by Indian tribes 188 and stated that "the dignity and respect afforded a
State, which the immunity is designed to protect, are placed in jeopardy whether
or not the suit is based on diversity jurisdiction." 189 And in Alden v. Maine, 190
the Court held that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity in
state court, in part because such a ruling would impinge upon the states' retained
sovereign dignity to be compelled to appear in its own courts at the behest of an
individual. 191
181. /d. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting)("The cost to the courts and the parties of permitting
piecemeal litigation of this sort clearly outweighs whatever benefit to their 'dignity' States or
state entities might derive by having their Eleventh Amendment claims subject to immediate
appellate review.").
182. 513 u.s. 30 (1994).
183. /d. at 46-50; accord id. at 41-42 (stating that because the states agreed to share power
with Congress in entering bistate compacts, no state dignity or integrity is questioned by a
private suit against the bistate entity); id. at 47 ("We have already pointed out that federal courts
are not alien to a bistate entity Congress participated in creating. Nor is it disrespectful to one
State to call upon the Compact Clause entity to answer complaints in federal court."). Although
the Court maintained that the principal impetus for Eleventh Amendment immunity is protection
of the state treasury, id. at 48, the Court made clear that it also, and almost equally, endorsed
Metcalf & Eddy's dignity rationale, id. at 52.
184. 517 u.s. 44 (1996).
185. /d. at 58 (quoting Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 146).
186. /d. at 72-73; see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2000).
187. 521 u.s. 261 (1997).
188. /d. at 267-70.
189. /d. at 268; accord id. at 277 ('The course of our case law indicates the wisdom and
necessity of considering, when determining the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment, the
real affront to a State of allowing a suit to proceed.").
190. 527 u.s. 706 (1999).
191. /d. at 714 (stating that the Constitution "reserves to [the states] a substantial portion of
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In 2002, however, the Court adopted the dignity rationale as the principal
justification for state sovereign immunity. In Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority, the Court held that sovereign immunity
barred a federal administrative proceeding brought by a private party against a
state. 192 The Court said that "[s]tates, upon ratification of the Constitution, did
not consent to become mere appendages of the Federal Government. Rather,
they entered the Union 'with their sovereignty intact. "' 193 An integral
component of that sovereignty is the immunity from compulsory private suits, 194
which the states did not surrender in ratifying the Constitution, 195 and which is
the principal justification for state sovereign immunity:
The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord
States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign
entities. ''The founding generation thought it 'neither becoming nor
convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with that
large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the
United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer the
complaints of private persons. "' 196
The Court reversed the priorities of Hess and sharply distinguished between
the primary rationale, dignity, and the secondary rationale, fiscal protection. 197
Dignity alone, claimed the Court, directed that states be permitted to assert

the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in
that status"); id. at 715 (''The generation that designed and adopted our federal system
considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity ."); id. at 749-50 (discussing
the indignity of coercing unwilling states to appear before an judicial tribunal); id. at 758
("When Congress legislates in matters affecting the States, it may not treat these sovereign
entities as mere prefectures or corporations. Congress must accord States the esteem due to
them as joint participants in a federal system, one beginning with the premise of sovereignty in
both the central Government and the separate States.").
192. 535 u.s. 743, 760 (2002).
193. /d. at 751 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Yill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
194. /d.
195. /d. at 752 ("Nevertheless, the Convention did not disturb States' immunity from private
suits, thus firmly enshrining this principle in our constitutional framework.").
196. /d. at 760 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999)) (citation omitted).
197. /d. at 7 65 ("While state sovereign immunity serves the important function of shielding
state treasuries and thus preserving 'the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of
their citizens,' the doctrine's central purpose is to 'accord the States the respect owed them as'
joint sovereigns.") (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 750-51; Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth.
v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)) (citation omitted); see also id. at 769 ("As
we have previously noted, however, the primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect
state treasuries, but to afford the States the dignity and respect due sovereign entities.") (citation
omitted).
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immunity in federal agency proceedings. 198 Justice Stevens' dissent, which
denigrated the dignity rationale as insufficient and laid to rest by Cohens, 199 fell
on deaf ears. The dignity rationale that began with Ayers is now firmly
entrenched in the justification for state sovereign immunity, and Cohens holds
no sway. The Court in Federal Maritime called the protection of state dignity
the Eleventh Amendment's "central purpose,"200 and on that basis expanded the
immunity doctrine to new boundaries.
F. Some Conclusions Regarding the Development of the Dignity Rationale

The development of the dignity rationale demonstrates that its dominance,
aside from the unique times of the post-Reconstruction bond wars, is a recent
phenomenon. Until Reconstruction, the Cohens view rejecting a state dignity
basis for Eleventh Amendment immunity prevailed. Though Ayers championed
the dignity rationale in 1887, it cited no legal support for the rationale, and its
omission of Cohens is conspicuous. A few years after Ayers, the dignity
rationale was quickly reduced to dissent by South Dakota and Young. The
rationale lay dormant for a century until it was resurrected with renewed force
by the Rehnquist Court. 201
The development also indicates that the rationale is a judicial creation, rather
than a legal postulate settled by history or constitutional text or structure.
Revolutionaries rejected traditional English notions of sovereign dignity in
1776. They declined to weave state dignity into the Constitution of 1787. State
dignity furnished no apparent support for the framing of the Eleventh
Amendment. Neither text nor history nor precedent justifies broad notions of
a state dignity capable of supporting sovereign immunity.

198. !d. at 760 ("Simply put, if the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State's
dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private parties in federal courts, we cannot
imagine that they would have found it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same thing
before the administrative tribunal of an agency, such as the FMC. The affront to a State's
dignity does not lessen when an adjudication takes place in an administrative tribunal as
opposed to an Article Ill court.") (citation omitted); cf. id. at 760 n.ll ("One, in fact, could
argue that allowing a private party to haul a State in front of such an administrative tribunal
constitutes a greater insult to a State's dignity than requiring a State to appear in an Article Ill
court presided over by a judge with life tenure nominated by the President of the United States
and confirmed by the United States Senate.").
199. ld. at 770-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. !d. at 765.
201. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the development of the dignity rationale in the
Court and its culmination in Federal Maritime is thatHansv. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the
seminal case expanding the Eleventh Amendment beyond its text, makes no mention of state
dignity, respect, or sovereignty, despite being decided only three years after In re Ayers, 123
u.s. 443 (1887).
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Because of the Court's failure to provide an explanation or grounding for the
dignity rationale, Federal Maritime's adoption of it as a justification for the
similarly untethered doctrine of state sovereignty is quite unsatisfying. Indeed,
by jumping back from the narrow text of the Eleventh Amendment to the less
certain "structure of the Constitution" to the completely unreferenced concept
of state dignity, Federal Maritime has drastically expanded the applicability of
state sovereign immunity and fashioned a powerful weapon to buttress other
state sovereignty doctrines.
Alarmingly, the Court has proceeded without so much as pausing to
determine if its adoption of the dignity rationale furthers traditional normative
values of federalism. 202 Federalism is justified to the extent it furthers diversity,
expertise, and localism, on the premise that these values in turn further
protection of liberty and democracy. 203 Neither dignity nor state sovereign
immunity furthers any of these values. As I have argued elsewhere, these values
are adequately and appropriately safeguarded by the constitutional system of
dual government and the limited enumeration of federal power. 204 Dignity adds
little support and actually adds the disruption of a boundless and immutable state
power.
202. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Forward: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 61 (1998) ("[T]he Court appears to be much more concerned about preserving the
dignity of the states - as if they were natural persons that could experience hurt feelings
beyond those of their residents - than in pursuing decentralization and the other policy goals
that federalism serves.") (citation omitted).
203. See Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, supra note 1, at 399-401. That is not to say that
decisions upholding federalism for federalism's sake have no inherent value per se. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Federalism,
however, has no inherent normative value: It does not, as the majority appears to assume,
blindly protect the interests of States from any incursion by the federal courts. Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.").
Court opinions vindicating federalism may have the expressivist value of a legitimizing effect.
Cf Carninker, Judicial Solicitude, supra note 13 (suggesting that the Court may be using the
dignity rationale as an expressivist norm). The Court does not appear to be using the dignity
rationale as an expressivistjustification to legitimize federalism for federalism's sake, but quite
the opposite; the Court justifies its sovereign immunity federalism decisions as protecting the
dignity of the states. See supra text accompanying note 12.
204. See Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, supra note 1, at 399-422. Recently, Professor Todd
Pettys has persuasively argued that dignity may help maintain that level of state autonomy
necessary for market-driven normative federalism to flourish, especially with respect to the
anticommandeering doctrine. See Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People's Affection:
Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace, 56 V AND. L. REv. 329, 370 (2003). I am not, however,
convinced that the dignity rationale is necessary to maintain that level of state autonomy.
Moreover, dignity, to the extent it immunizes states from the truth-seeking forums of the courts
in the Eleventh Amendment context, may ultimately obscure facts that the people would need
to best participate in their government-choosing role.
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Finally, there is an obvious paradox in immunizing states from suit based on
dignity. Even accepting that states possess some sovereign dignity entitling
them to respect or deference, shouldn't that respect or deference diminish when
the state purportedly violates individual rights? Immunity ultimately shields
states from the negative publicity attending the indignity of their own actions,
not just the indignity of suit by a private individual. An immunity inspired by
state dignity should lessen when the state acts in ways inconsistent with that
dignity.
Very little supports Federal Maritime's embrace of the dignity rationale. Its
connection to the Constitution is tenuous at best; its historical support, sorely
lacking; its faithfulness to precedent, strained; its protection of federalism
values, questionable; and its very logic, twisted. But despite all of its flaws,
could the dignity rationale at least succeed as a doctrinal adhesive, something
sorely needed for the Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence? Oddly,
the answer is yes.
III. The Dignity Rationale and State Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence
Accepting the Court's premise that dignity is an inherent part of the state
sovereignty left intact by the Constitution helps reconcile what scholars have
identified as two distinct theories behind state sovereign immunity: a
sovereignty strain, which views the states as possessing real sovereign attributes
with effects independent of any normative analysis; and a practical strain, which
looks to the necessity of state suits in the context of other enforcement
mechanisms. 205 The dignity rationale originates in the sovereignty strain and
thus is presumed to be inviolable. However, this is merely a presumption that
can be overcome by compelling federal interests. For all its flaws, the dignity
rationale helps explain a great deal about the Court's state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence. The following subsections explain how, piece by piece.
A. The Status of the Plaintiff

States are not immune from suits brought by sister states 206 or the federal
government. 207 By contrast, dignity immunizes suits brought by individual
citizens. One obvious reason for the distinction is that the text of Article m
expressly contemplates federal jurisdiction over the former but only implicitly

205. See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 13, at 246; Vazquez, supra note 22, at 859-60.
206. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318 (1904); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
207. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S.
621 (1892).
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over the latter. 208 Perhaps more importantly, however- because the textual
justification is weak and because the immunity doctrine has moved away from
textual references in any case - the dignity rationale also explains the
distinction.
As Justice White wrote in dissent in South Dakota, state sovereign dignity
still exists and may be infringed by any suit brought against a state. 209 That is
consistent with the default immunity rule that the dignity rationale prohibits suits
against states.
But dignity is impinged less by suits brought by the superior sovereign federal
government or a co-equal sovereign sister state than by suits brought by
individuals. 210 One might argue that the Framers' Whiggish notions of popular
sovereignty suggest the opposite; but an appropriate rejoinder is, I think, that
even under Whig philosophy, small numbers of individuals have superior
sovereignty to their elected representatives but not to the state itself, which is
actually the collective will of the people in their sovereign capacity. 211 The state
governments, then, have dignity not because they are governments per se, but
because they represent the ultimate sovereign will of the state citizenry. In the
context of a civil suit against the state by an individual, the ultimate sovereign
will feel the coercive effect of the suit. Just as the shareholders of a privatelyheld company may be offended by public or private criticism of their company,
the people of a state may feel the indignity of their state being hauled into court
at the insistence of a single individual, who may even be from a different state.
Suits brought by individuals, then, have a far greater dignity hurdle to surmount
than suits brought by another sovereign. 212
Consideration of the second half of the equation leads to the reasonable
conclusion that federal interests are not strong enough to overcome the indignity
of an individual suit but are strong enough to overcome the indignity of a
sovereign suit. One countervailing interest is the need to promote internal
harmony. The clashing of sovereign interests in a federal system lacking an
available forum for peaceful resolution may result in disunion and retribution. 213
208. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill,§ 2, cl. 1.
209. See South Dakota, 192 U.S. at 342-43 (White, J., dissenting).
210. See Caminker, Judicial Solicitude, supra note 13, at 84 ("[A] superior or at least
coequal sovereign pose[s] less of an affront to states than suits by private persons .... ").
211. But see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,472-73 (1792) (arguing that the
collective citizenry is not superior to the individual).
212. This is especially true when the other sovereign is the collective will of the national
populace. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,403-05 (1819).
213. See South Dakota, 192 U.S. at 318 (asserting that the federal forum serves as an
important and impartial arbiter for suits between states); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621,
644-45 (1892) ("[The Framers] could not have overlooked the possibility that controversies,
capable of judicial solution, might arise between the United States and some of the States, and
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The threat to national harmony is less forceful in suits brought by an individual
against a state. In other words, telling an individual he is out of luck is less
damaging to national unity than telling the United States or another state the
same thing.
A second countervailing interest is the need to ensure that private interests do
not bankrupt governmental interests. Drawing the line at suits between
sovereigns ensures that only controversies significant enough to be at a
sovereign level are permitted. If an individual position is itself substantial
enough, the sovereign can take over and bring suit in the name of the sovereign
interest, though a sovereign bringing suit merely for private interests may still
be barred. 214

that the permanence of the Union might be endangered if to some tribunal was not entrusted the
power to determine them according to the recognized principles of law. And to what tribunal
could a trust so momentous be more appropriately committed than to that which the people of
the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice and insure domestic
tranquillity, have constituted with authority to speak for all the people and all the States, upon
questions before it to which the judicial power of the nation extends?"); id. at 639-40 ("The
necessity for the creation of some tribunal for the settlement of [State v. State] controversies that
might arise, under the new government to be formed, must, therefore, have been perceived by
the framers of the Constitution, and, consequently, among the controversies to which the
judicial power of the United States was extended by the Constitution, we find those between two
or more States."); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821) ("There was not
much reason to fear that foreign or sister States would be creditors to any considerable amount,
and there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the Court in those cases, because it might be
essential to the preservation of peace. The amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced
or prosecuted by individuals, but not to those brought by States."); see also Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 33 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (''The inherent necessity of a
tribunal for peaceful resolution of disputes between the Union and the individual States, and
between the individual States themselves, is incomparably greater, in my view, than the need
for a tribunal to resolve disputes on federal questions between individuals and the States."),
overruled on other grounds by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328 (1934) (explaining that State v. State suits involve
"a distinct and essential principle of the constitutional plan which provided means for the
judicial settlement of controversies between States of the Union"); id. (''The establishment of
a permanent tribunal with adequate authority to determine controversies between the States, in
place of an inadequate scheme of arbitration, was essential to the peace of the Union."); id. at
329; THE FEDERAUST No. 80, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
214. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59 (1972); see also Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981) ("[A]n original action between two States only
violates the Eleventh Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually suing to recover for injuries
to specific individuals."). Interestingly, in South Dakota, an individual gave plaintiff-South
Dakota his North Carolina bonds because he feared his suit would be barred by sovereign
immunity. See ROBERT F. DURDEN, RECONSTRUCfiON BONDS AND TwENTIETH-CENTURY
POUTICS 31-32, 52 (1962).
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Whether the line should be drawn between individual and sovereign
plaintiffs, it can certainly be argued consistently with the dignity rationale, that
the line is reasonable. Such a distinction runs into problems, however, in suits
brought by other sovereigns.
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi 215 and Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noata/2 16 held states immune from suits by foreign states217 and Indian tribes, 218
respectively. Those cases rested on the conclusion that the states did not
consent to such suits in ratifying the Constitution because these sovereigns fell
outside of the constitutional plan. 219
These cases need rethinking in light of the dignity rationale. Mutuality of
concession is not a factor for the dignity rationale. More importantly, these
sovereign plaintiffs have sufficient stature that their status as plaintiffs would
mean less indignity to a defendant-state than a suit by an individual. Also,
important national interests are implicated when a state invokes immunity in its
own courts from suit by a foreign sovereign. Foreign and Indian affairs are a
principal province of the national government, and the need for national
uniformity and diplomacy is an important national interest. If the Court pursues
its dignity rationale, it owes an explanation for the results in these two cases. 220
B. The Source of Law

State immunity from private suits under state law makes some sense under the
dignity rationale because the sovereign's right to either invoke or waive
immunity through its own laws is in full respect of its own dignity. Suits under
federal law, on the other hand, are different because they implicate the will of
a superior sovereign.

u.s.
u.s.

215. 292
313 (1934).
216. 501
775 (1991).
217. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330 (''The foreign State lies outside the structure of the Union.

The waiver or consent, on the part of a State, which inheres in the acceptance of the
constitutional plan, runs to the other States who have likewise accepted that plan, and to the
United States as the sovereign which the Constitution creates. We perceive no ground upon
which it can be said that any waiver or consent by a State of the Union has run in favor of a
foreign State.").
218. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782 ("What makes the States' surrender of immunity from suit
by sister States plausible is the mutuality of that concession. There is no such mutuality with
either foreign sovereigns or Indian tribes .... [l]fthe convention could not surrender the tribes'
immunity for the benefit of the States, we do not believe that it surrendered the States' immunity
for the benefit of the tribes.") (emphasis omitted).
219. See id. at 781-82; Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330-31.
220. One rationale rather distinct from the dignity rationale may be found in international
law. See, e.g., EMERDEVATIEL,LEDROITDESGENS,0UPRINCIPESDELALOINATURELLE48687 (1758) (stating that foreign sovereigns are exempt from the compulsory process of another
sovereign).
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The effect on the dignity of the state is slightly different when an individual
sues under federal, rather than state, law. States are bound by the Supremacy
Clause to follow federal laws, 221 and an individual who sues a state for violation
of federal law could make a powerful claim that a state is not entitled to the
same respect or dignity when it deviates from its binding obligations.
Additionally, individual suits provide a valuable mechanism for ensuring state
compliance with federal law, and immunizing states from such suits could give
rise to flagrant disregard for federal supremacy.
The Court has nevertheless upheld immunity in federal question cases
because of the existence of other means of ensuring state compliance with
federal law, 222 such as the good faith of the states to abide by the law, 223
voluntary consent, 224 induced waiver, 225 the federal government's ability to sue
for enforcement,226 Section 5 private enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 227 suits brought by other states, suits against local governments, 228
and suits against state officers. 229
One should be suspicious of the sufficiency of these safeguards. I question,
for example, whether induced waiver really provides an appropriate vehicle for
the enforcement of legal obligations. Good faith and voluntary consent suffer
from irresistible economic pressures, not to mention historical failure. 230 Suits
221. U.S. CONST. art. VI,§ 1, cl. 2.
222. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
223. See id. ("We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution
or obey the binding laws of the United States.").
224. See id. ("Many States, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a
wide variety of suits."); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,53 (1944) (proclaiming that
immunity is "mitigated by a sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the
suability of the sovereign").
225. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755.
226. See id.
227. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
228. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln County
v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
229. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-57; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,71 n.14 (1996).
230. It was the southern states' refusal to abide by treaties and the Articles of Confederation
that led to the scrapping of the Articles in favor of the Constitution. See supra text
accompanying notes 70-80; cf THE FEDERAUST No. 15, supra note 46, at 110 ('There was a
time when we were told that breaches by the States of the regulations of the federal authority
were not to be expected; that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the
respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the constitutional requisitions
of the Union. This language, at the present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what
we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further lessons
from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true
springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to the
establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions
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brought by the federal government or sister states are available, but limited
resources and attenuated interest prevent many private wrongs from being
remedied. 231 Section 5 enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment is limited
in subject matter. 232 Suits against substate entities are irrelevant when the
federal violation was by a state. And suits against state officers are available
only for prospective injunctive relief, a remedy which may insufficiently
compensate the victim and insufficiently deter violations of federallaw. 233 To
make matters worse, the Court has exhibited an unabashed willingness to
winnow these alternative enforcement mechanisms. 234
The dignity rationale can justify immunity from federal question lawsuits on
the simple ground that dignity is impermissibly impaired regardless of the
strength of other mechanisms to ensure compliance with federal law and despite
the decreased indignity to the state. Though this rationale is facially weak, it
could be strengthened by a showing that the alternative mechanisms for
enforcement really do help to ensure compliance with federal law. If, on the

of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint.").
231. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 22, at 888 (arguing that governmental agencies have
neither the resources nor the motivation to combat state infractions at a level equal to that of
individual plaintiffs). On the flip side, governmental responsibility may help ensure that the
states are not subjected to the more frivolous claims.
232. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.") (emphasis added).
233. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011, 1016 (2000) ("[M]any violations do not arise from ongoing
practices subject to injunctive orders, while in other cases ... the employer may come into
compliance so as to make injunctive relief inappropriate. In those cases, a rule that only
injunctions may be obtained is tantamount to a rule that no relief is available. Even where
ongoing practices exist, merely enjoining their continuation fails to compensate for harm
suffered, and may not by itself provide adequate incentives for reasonably complete and prompt
compliance."); Vazquez, supra note 22, at 875 (predicting "numerous, albeit temporary,
violations of federal law").
234. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369-72 (2001)
(requiring Congress to show past constitutional violations by the states); Coil. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999) (eliminating implied
waiver); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 251, 287 (1997) (refusing to permit Ex parte
Young suits for a de facto quiet title to land because "Idaho's sovereign interest in its lands and
waters would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy
upon funds in its Treasury"); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 ("[W]here Congress has prescribed
a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a
court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a
state officer based upon Ex parte Young."); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg' 1Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979) (suggesting that sovereign immunity may protect county
officials if the judgment would run against the state treasury).
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other hand, the alternative mechanisms are poor enforcers, the dignity rationale
may demand reevaluation of immunity under federal law.
In any case, the Court has held that Congress can abrogate state sovereign
immunity in at least one instance of federal law. Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment235 authorizes Congress to subject the states to private suit for the
purpose of enforcing the mandates of that Amendment. 236 The Fourteenth
Amendment does so, according to the Court, because it specifically
contemplates direct congressional regulation of the states237 and dramatically
altered the federal-state balance of power in favor of the federal government. 238
In other words, the constitutional prerogative of the federal government to
enforce compliance with the Constitution is at its zenith under the Fourteenth
Amendment, while state dignity is minimal because the rights to be protected are
constitutional239 and were agreed upon by the states at the Amendment's
ratification. 240 The Fourteenth Amendment simply tips the balance of federal
power over the dignity-based state immunity.

C. The Effect of the Forum
Accepting the Court's determination that dignity immunizes states from
certain suits in federal court, those same suits should fail in other forums as
well, simply on the ground that the national judicial forum best furthers national
interests and best comports with the dignity of the state defendant. 241 Indeed,
235. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ('The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
236. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
237. /d. at 453; accord Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 ("We noted that§ 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment contained prohibitions expressly directed at the States and that § 5 of the
Amendment expressly provided that 'The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.'") (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (stating that the Amendment's provisions are "limitations
of the power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress").
238. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455; accord Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (explaining that
the Fourteenth Amendment "fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck
by the Constitution").
239. See Caminker, Judicial Solicitude, supra note 13, at 84.
240. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346 ('The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
are directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power.... Such
enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States
have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered Congress to enact.").
241. Although the Eleventh Amendment by its terms only restricts the power of the federal
judiciary to hear certain suits against states, the Amendment has not been construed as a
limitation on state sovereign immunity in other forums. See U.S. CaNST. amend. Xl; Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (holding that state sovereign
immunity shields states from federal administrative proceedings); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 713 (1999) ("[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited
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subjecting a nonconsenting state to suit in its own courts may offend its dignity
to an even greater extent because it coerces the state, if necessary, to sanction
itself. 242 Likewise, forcing a nonconsenting state to appear in a federal
administrative proceeding may be a more serious affront than a suit before
Article ill judges confirmed for life. 243 Accordingly, it is consistent with the
dignity rationale to uphold state sovereign immunity in federal court, in a state's
own courts, and before federal agencies.
More complicated is a suit against a state in a different state's courts. The
Court has held that a state's sovereign immunity from a suit brought by an
individual in another state's courts is a matter of comity, not constitutional
mandate. 244 The dignity rationale may counsel a different result. 245
The indignity of being forced to appear as a defendant in federal courts,246 a
state's own courts, 247 and federal adjudicative tribunals 248 is no less profound in
a sister state's courts. The state is being haled unwillingly by a private
individual before a foreign tribunal. 249 That the tribunal happens to sit in a sister
state does not make the coercion any less ignominious.
Nor is there a strong link between eliminating immunity and protecting the
peace of the union. In fact, the absence of immunity here may beget particularly
by, the tenns of the Eleventh Amendment.").
242. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 ("In some ways, of course, a congressional power to
authorize private suits against nonconsenting States in their own courts would be even more
offensive to state sovereignty than a power to authorize the suits in a federal forum .... A power
to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the other branches of the State,
furthermore, is the power first to turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the
entire political machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of individuals. Such
plenary federal control of state governmental processes denigrates the separate sovereignty of
the States.") (citations omitted).
243. Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 535 U.S. at 760 n.11 ("One, in fact, could argue that allowing a
private party to haul a State in front of such an administrative tribunal constitutes a greater insult
to a State's dignity than requiring a State to appear in an Article ill court presided over by a
judge with life tenure nominated by the President of the United States and confirmed by the
United States Senate.").
244. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,425 (1979) ("But these provisions do not imply that
any one State's immunity from suit in the courts of another State is anything other than a matter
of comity.").
245. But see Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 489 (2003) (declining to reconsider
Hall); Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 (distinguishing Hall).
246. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
247. See Alden, 527 U.S. 706.
248. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 743.
249. In this respect, the inability of a state to assert immunity in another state's court is in
considerable tension with a state's right to assert immunity in federal court. See Smith, supra
note 13, at 101 ("Under current doctrine, the states have more authority with respect to each
other than the federal government has with respect to the states.").
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hostile relationships between states. The defendant state might withdraw its
money from the forum state's banks to impair the forum state's attempt to effect
a money judgment, or it might readjust its own court procedures with respect to
the forum state in tit-for-tat retaliation. 25 Federal jurisdiction over conflicts
between states permits an ostensibly impartial resolution. State jurisdiction over
a conflict involving another state does not present the same aura of impartiality.
If the dignity rationale is to prevail, it may require immunity in other states'
courts. 251

°

D. The Status of the Defendant

Sovereign immunity does not protect substate entities such as cities, counties,
or local school boards. 252 This is in accord with the dignity rationale. Though
the Eleventh Amendment speaks only to protecting states, the Court has based
250. Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 417 n.l2 (1979) (noting these possibilities); id. at
427 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I suspect that the Court has opened the door to avenues of
liability and interstate retaliation that will prove unsettling and upsetting for our federal
system."); id. at 429 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("States in all likelihood will retaliate against
one another for respectively abolishing the 'sovereign immunity' doctrine. States' legal officers
will be required to defend suits in all other States. States probably will decide to modify their
tax-collection and revenue systems in order to avoid the collection of judgments .... Under the
Court's decision, Nevada will have strong incentive to withdraw those balances and place them
in Nevada banks so as to insulate itself from California judgments."); id. at 443 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ('This decision cannot help but induce some 'Balkanization' in state relationships
as States try to isolate assets from foreign judgments and generally reduce their contacts with
other jurisdictions. That will work to the detriment of smaller States -like Nevada- who are
more dependent on the facilities of a dominant neighbor- in this case, California.").
251. Historical statements suggest founding era support for immunity in a sister state's
courts. See 3 EWOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 549 (Edmund Pendleton) (noting "[t]he
impossibility of calling a sovereign state before the jurisdiction of another sovereign state"); 4
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 130 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 1992) (Edmund Randolph) ("[A)s far as a particular state can be a party defendant,
a sister state cannot be her judge. Were the states of America unconfederated, they would be
as free from mutual controul as other disjoined nations. Nor does the federal compact narrow
this exemption; but confirms it, by establishing a common arbiter in the federal judiciary, whose
constitutional authority may administer redress."). In addition, the preratification case of
Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 81 n. * (Pa. 1781), suggests the same. Nathan, 1 U.S. at 80
nn.(a) & 1 ("The true ground of this decision is, that a sovereign state is not suable in the
municipal courts of another jurisdiction, and a foreign attachment is but a mode of compelling
an appearance. Whilst the states have surrendered certain powers to the general government,
they have not divested themselves of the attribute of state sovereignty.").
252. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977)
(public school boards); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21 (1973) (counties);
Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 522 (1900) (cities); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529
(1890) (counties). The Court recently reaffirmed that substate entities are not entitled to
sovereign immunity. See Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003).
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its decisions on extratextual reasons. In Lincoln County v. Luning/53 for
example, the Court held that counties are not immune from suits because of a
long historical practice of private individuals suing counties. 254 Moreover,
subs tate entities have long been characterized as more akin to corporations than
governmental bodies. 255 The exclusion of substate entities from immunity
protection stems from the characterizing of substate entities as lacking sufficient
sovereign dignity. 256
But what if the defendant is the governor of the state or some other state
officer?257 The first case to discuss this problem was the original dignityrationale case, In re Ayers, which essentially suggested that an officer could be
sued in his individual capacity for actions prohibited by federal law because
actions unauthorized under federal law - and therefore unauthorized under
state law- must be personal actions. 258 Separating the official from the state
makes application of the dignity rationale easy, and necessary, for the In re
Ayers Court. It also comports with English law, which held that the king could
never authorize illegal conduct, and therefore, an official's illegal acts were not
attributed to the king, 259 but were the official's own illegal acts, subjecting the
official to individualliability. 260 The dignity rationale justifies suing an official
253. 133 u.s. 529 (1890).
254. /d. at 530 (citing the number of suits against counties in the previous thirty years). The
Court decided Luning on the same day that it did Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), so it
is no wonder that the text of the Eleventh Amendment was not dispositive.
255. See 1 STEWART SYD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 28 (1793) (treating
private and public corporations as two branches of the same subject). In Chisholm v. Georgia,
Chief Justice Jay assumed the proposition that cities lacked the sovereign attributes that Georgia
claimed. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 417,472-73 (1793).
256. See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 50, at 1106.
257. See Althouse, supra note 13, at 265 (asking how the dignity rationale can be reconciled
with Ex parte Young).
258. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887) ("Nor need it be apprehended that the
construction of the 11th Amendment, applied in this case, will in anywise embarrass or obstruct
the execution of the laws of the United States, in cases where officers of a State are guilty of
acting in violation of them under color of its authority .... If, therefore, an individual, acting
under the assumed authority of a State, as one of its officers, and under color of its laws, comes
into conflict with the superior authority of a valid law of the United States, he is stripped of his
representative character, and subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States.").
259. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *244. "If the king really had given such [illegal]
commands or instructions, he must have been deceived." 6 WilliAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OFENGUSH LAW 101 (1903).
260. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 259, at 388; Sands v. Child, 3 Lev. 351, 352, 83 Eng.
Rep. 725, 726 (K.B. 1693) ("[F]or the warrant of no man, not even of the King himself, can
excuse the doing of an illegal act .... ").
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in his individual capacity because the official has no inherent dignity himself.
Further, because an official's unauthorized conduct divorces him from the state,
the suit does not run against the state, which would subject the state to the
indignity of suit.
Things are more complicated when an officer is sued in his official capacity,
which necessarily links the official to state actions. In Ex parte Young, the
Court considered whether it had jurisdiction over a state officer for contempt of
a federal court order enjoining him from attempting to enforce an
unconstitutional state law. 261 Young argued that the suit was really against the
state and barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 262 Young had a point; the Court
had previously held that official actions are actions of the state sufficient to
implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. 263 But the Court's reasoning in Ex parte
Young tracked In re Ayers:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be
so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act
to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of
and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or
governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a
state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to
enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks
to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in
proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped
of his official or representative character and is subjected in his
person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States. 264
Young "carv[ed] out a necessary exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity"265 because some remedy was needed to assure the enforcement of
federal law. 266 Young does not, however, answer the question of how an
261. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
262. /d. at 132.
263. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879) ("Whoever, by virtue of public
position under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due
process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the
constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the
State's power, his act is that of the State.").
264. Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
265. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
266. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Young, 209 U.S. 123; see also Alden v.
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official's conduct can be "official conduct" and yet not be state action for
purposes of sovereign immunity. 267 To make matters more confusing, the Court
has continued down the fictional path by, for example, restricting Young to
prospective injunctive relief. 268
The Young doctrine is in some tension with the dignity rationale. If the
official action really is divorced from the state, then there is no indignity to the
state regardless of the remedy sought. If, on the other hand, the official's
separation from the state is incomplete and indignity still attains, even
prospective injunctive relief should be barred, for the Court has repeatedly
stressed that sovereign immunity is immunity from suit, regardless of the relief
sought. 269 In either case, the compensatory-injunctive relief distinction is

Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999) ("Ex Parte Young is based in part on the premise that
sovereign immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both state and federal courts,
and that certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must therefore be
permitted if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land.") (citation omitted);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-06 (1984) ("[T]he Young
doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights
and hold state officials responsible . . . ."); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Ex parte Young was the culmination of
efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective
supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.").
267. See Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (recognizing the "irony" but avoiding explanation).
268. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106 ("In sum, Edelman's distinction between prospective
and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time
preserving to an important degree to constitutional immunity of the States."); Edelman, 415 U.S.
651.
269. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002)
("[S]overeign immunity applies regardless of whether a private plaintiffs suit is for monetary
damages or some other type of relief."); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,58 (1996)
("But we have often made it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant
to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."); Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994) (stating that immunity is not solely to
"prevent[] ... federal-courtjudgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"); Metcalf &
Eddy, 506 U.S. at 146 ("While application of the collateral order doctrine in this type of case
is justified in part by a concern that States not be unduly burdened by litigation, its ultimate
justification is the importance of ensuring that the States' dignitary interests can be fully
vindicated."); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100 (affirming that the immunity bar "applies regardless
of the nature ofthereliefsought"); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85,90 (1982) ("It would be a novel
proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself
simply because no money judgment is sought."); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933)
("Expressly applying to suits in equity as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces
demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when
these are asserted and prosecuted by an individual against a State.").
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irrelevant. 270
The matter need not be so black or white, however. If the Court insists on
characterizing the state as having dignity, further anthropomorphizing may
illustrate dignity's reconciliation with Young. 211 The state certainly will be
embarrassed by what one of its delinquent children has done, though perhaps
less embarrassed because the officer is the one named, not the state itself. 272 The
state may take comfort in the acceptance that the state (itself a fiction, after all)
is deemed unaccountable for the illegal act. Although there is a connection
between the sued officer and the state in terms of state dignity, that connection
is attenuated. Thus, Young may be reconciled with the dignity rationale because
a remedy sensitive to the state's relatively minor interest in dignity is necessary
to ensure compliance with federal law; thus, the officer, but not the state,
appears to bear the brunt of the remedy. 273 If the Court is willing to take a
careful and meticulous approach, it may be able to fashion a principled rationale
for the compensatory-injunctive distinction based on the dignity rationale.
E. The Consent of the State

The Court has made clear that states may waive their sovereign immunity and
consent to suit. 274 By placing the control of a state's destiny in its own hands,
270. To the extent that state dignity is implicated in an officer suit, there is arguably more
indignity in the imposition of an injunction than in a money judgment. The state would suffer
both the indignity of suit and the indignity of a commandeered remedy. For more on the tension
between Ex parte Young and the anticommandeering doctrine, see infra text accompanying
notes 327-328.
271. I realize that this anthropomorphosis may seem a bit jarring, and I share others'
skepticism of attributing distinctly human qualities to governmental entities. See, e.g.,
Carninker, Judicial Solicitude, supra note 13, at 85 (calling the characterization "silly").
Nevertheless, my goal here is to explore what role the dignity rationale could play in uniting
state sovereign immunity doctrines. Taking the personalization of dignity one step further does
just that, at least with respect to Ex parte Young. I also think the anthropomorphosis is less
jarring when the state is taken as merely representative of the sovereignty of the state citizenry,
rather than as an independent and self-standing entity. See supra text accompanying notes 210212.
272. See Carninker, Judicial Solicitude, supra note 13, at 84. But see Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997) (''The real interests served by the Eleventh
Amendment are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of captions and pleading.").
273. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("Both prospective and retrospective
relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of the
sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end
a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring
the supremacy of that law.").
274. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1887); see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) (holding that a state's voluntary removal to federal court
waives Eleventh Amendment immunity); Couer D'Alene, 521 U.S. at 267 ("[A] State can waive
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the waiver rule coincides with state dignity. The state can hardly complain of
an ignominy if it is free to object but does not do so. 275
There are several anomalies which must be addressed, however, the first
being the conflict between waiver and the characterization of sovereign
immunity as a limitation on the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 276 Though
subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable, 277 states may waive their sovereign
immunity and consent to suit. The court has not clearly resolved this paradox.278
Perhaps the best resolution lies in rethinking the characterization of state
sovereign immunity as a limitation on judicial power. If it is indeed so
completely divorced from the text of the Constitution as the Court has intimated,
it need not be bound by the Eleventh Amendment's reference to a limit on "the
judicial Power," which by its terms would not recognize a consent-based
exercise ofjurisdiction. 279 There are satisfying ways of characterizing sovereign
immunity as a doctrine of personal jurisdiction, rather than subject matter
jurisdiction,280 which also comport with the dignity rationale. 281 The Court has
its Eleventh Amendment protection and allow a federal court to hear and decide a case
commenced or prosecuted against it."). Consent seems to have been a featured part of immunity
since ratification. See, e.g., THE FEDERAUST No. 81, supra note 59, at 487 ("It is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.")
(emphasis added); 3 EWOT'SDEBATES, supra note 57, at 533 (James Madison) (stating that the
Constitution "give[s] a citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should
condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it").
275. This is particularly true with regard to federal funds accepted under Spending Clause
legislation. As I have noted elsewhere, Congress' attempt to purchase consent under the
Spending Power is properly construed as a permissible solicitation of voluntary waiver. See
Dodson, Metes and Bounds, supra note 1, at 723 n.18.
276. The Eleventh Amendment expressly limits ''judicial Power." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The Court has interpreted the Amendment as "partak[ing] ... of a jurisdictional bar." Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974).
277. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,377 n.21 (1978); Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 148, 149 (1834).
278. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 127-28 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled
by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
279. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Our willingness to allow
States to waive their immunity thus demonstrates that this immunity is not a product of the
limitation of judicial power contained in the Eleventh Amendment.").
280. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1887) ("The immunity from suit belonging
to a State ... is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure ....") (emphasis added);
Nelson, supra note 51. Going too far in anthropomorphizing states for state sovereign immunity
purposes, however, may spill over into other areas which are highly problematic, such as
analogies to individual constitutional rights. Elsewhere I have expressed doubt about the
propriety of this analogy. See Dodson, Metes and Bounds, supra note 1, at 749 n.l44.
281. Construing sovereign immunity as something less than a limitation on judicial power
has the added advantage of alleviating tension with the Ex parte Young doctrine, a judicially-
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already experimented a bit with the nomenclature, calling it "a sovereign
immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the Federal Judiciary's
subject-matter jurisdiction."282
A second possible answer lies in characterizing the dignity rationale as a
preconditional factor to jurisdiction. Under this theory, the jurisdictional bar
arises only when a state's dignity is impermissibly impugned. If the state
consents to suit, its dignity has not been denigrated, and jurisdiction applies.
Thus, the state is not waiving the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
rather, it is refusing to assert the necessary predicate for the jurisdictional bar in
the first place.
The waiver-consent rule helps resolve appellate review cases in light of the
dignity rationale. 283 All federal appellate review cases initially involved a state
action. If the state was the plaintiff in the original state suit, as was the case in
Cohens v. Virginia, it has chosen to invoke the jurisdiction of its own courts and
should be held to have thereby consented to any appellate review, federal or
state, whether initiated by itself or by the defendant. 284 A state sued in its own
courts can, of course, invoke immunity under Alden; if it fails to do so, it could
be held to have waived that immunity by the time the case comes to the Supreme
Court.
This waiver construction conflicts with the Court's dictum that immunity may
be invoked at any time, including on appeal, 285 though, in light of the Court's
created exception to sovereign immunity.
282. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,267 (1997); accord Wis. Dep't ofCorr.
v. Scheadt, 524 U.S. 381, 391 (1998)(asserting that whether "Eleventh Amendment immunity
is a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction [is] a question we have not decided").
283. The Court has unconvincingly attempted to .reconcile federal review with waiver by
conflating state judicial consent to federal review and state consent to suit. See McKesson Corp.
v. Fla. Alcohol & Tobacco Di v ., 496 U.S. 18, 30 ( 1990) ("[W]hen a state court takes cognizance
of a case, the State assents to appellate review by this Court of the federal issues raised in the
case 'whoever may be the parties to the original suit, whether private persons, or the state
itself."') (quoting Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 585 (1837)
(Story, J., dissenting)). This approach is highly problematic on state separation of powers
grounds and in tension with the Court's own immunity-waiver jurisprudence.
284. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900) (Consent to suit in state court is
"subject always to the condition, arising out of the supremacy of the Constitution of the United
States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, that the final judgment of the highest court of
the State in any action brought against it with its consent may be reviewed or reexamined [by
this Court].").
285. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (considering the defense though
raised for the first time on appeal); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857) ("It
is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be
sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission; but it may, if it thinks
proper, waive this privilege, and permit itself to be made a defendant in a suit by individuals,
or by another State. And as this permission is altogether voluntary on the part of the
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more recent determination that a state's voluntary removal to federal court
constitutes a waiver of its sovereign immunity, the conflict is not
irreconcilable. 286 The conflict could be resolved by pushing the state's right to
renege as far back as possible without buckling completely. In other words, the
state may assert immunity at any time until the state court of last resort issues its
opinion. At that moment, the state's dignity interest is at its nadir while the
federal interests are at their zenith.
The state's dignity interest in immunity from suit is minimized because it has
already submitted to a few rounds of court battles with the prospect of adverse
judgment. Federal appellate review, unlike state appellate review, is also
somewhat more deferential because the appellate decision acts upon the lower
state court judgment, rather than upon the state as a party to the litigation. 287 In
contrast, the need for impartial and uniform interpretation of federal law is
paramount. 288 Otherwise, states could obtain favorable and biased decisions
from their state supreme courts construing federal law in their favor and insulate
those decisions from federal court review by asserting immunity upon the
individual's petition for federal review. 289

sovereignty, it follows that it may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be
sued, and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted, and may withdraw its consent
whenever it may suppose that justice to the public requires it."); see also Christina Bohannan,

Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal
Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 290-91 (2002) (arguing that, as a limit on subject matter
jurisdiction, states may assert sovereign immunity for the first time even on a collateral attack
to the judgment).
286. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002). Prior to Lapides,
scholars had noted that the Court had not been clear about when a state would have been
deemed to have waived its immunity. See William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment:
Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 843, 850 (2000).
287. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,372 (1821) (explaining that "appellate
jurisdiction ... acts, not on the State, but on its Courts").
288. See id. at 391 (discussing the "partiality of the State tribunals"); id. at 415-16 (''Thirteen
independent Courts ... of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws,
is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.").
289. See id. at 407 ("A general interest might well be felt in leaving to a State the full power
of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it; but no
interest could be felt in so changing the relations between the whole and its parts, as to strip the
government of the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its Courts, the constitution and
laws from active violation."); see also McKesson Corp. v. Fla. Alcohol & Tobacco Div., 496
U.S. 18, 29 (1990) ("To secure state-court compliance with, and national uniformity of, federal
law, the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over cases encompassing issues of federal law
is subject to two conditions: State courts must interpret and enforce faithfully the 'supreme Law
of the Land,' and their decisions are subject to review by this Court.") (citations omitted)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI).
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F. Sovereign Immunity Conclusions
The Court's distancing of state sovereign immunity from textual anchors
permits the dignity rationale to be viewed doctrinally as an immunization from
suit unless other circumstances justify federal supremacy. This surprisingly
simple equation is flexible enough to build a workable and (substantially)
principled framework for state sovereign immunity. It will take significant care
and foresight, and perhaps some retweaking of old opinions, but it can be done.
The Court must be particularly careful, however, with the dignity theory's
ramifications for other state sovereignty doctrines. The dignity theory is bigger
than state sovereign immunity; its effects radiate beyond the immunity
doctrine. 290 Part N examines how the adoption of the dignity rationale may
affect other state sovereignty strains.
N. A Perspective on the Future
As I have written elsewhere at length, the several state sovereignty doctrines
can be thought of as linked by a common focus. State sovereign immunity, state
regulatory immunity, and the anticommandeering principle focus their energies
in defense of a federal power bearing down on the state. The resolution of these
vertical issues depends on the relative strengths of the federal government's
power to control and of the state's power to resist. 291 In the confines of state
sovereign immunity, dignity clearly buttresses the latter.
The Court's decision to move away from textual codifications of state
sovereign immunity and embrace the decidedly nontextual dignity rationale
means that dignity is not confined to the Eleventh Amendment. It is, according
to the Court, something inherent in state sovereignty. Dignity, therefore, is not
confined to state sovereign immunity. 292 Its adoption in that context shifts the
290. Cf. Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67
U. CHI. L. REv. 1089, 1149 (2000) ("The doctrinal decontextualization involved in the
conventional strategy of studying a line of doctrine from its earliest expression through its most
recent is thus fundamentally misguided. . . . Such an approach too easily blinds us to the
dynamics of interdoctrinal connections .... ").
291. See Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, supra note I, at 411-22.
292. That the Court has pinpointed the one specific "indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the insistence of private parties," Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 666, 749 (1999) (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)), does not mean that a
more generalized principle of state dignity is confined to state sovereign immunity analysis. The
Court's regulatory immunity and anti commandeering doctrines exhibit similar sentiments, albeit
without using the term "dignity." See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997)
(decrying federal commands '"reduc[ing the states] to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress"' by
'"dragoon[ing]"' state officials) (quoting Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975));
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,845 (1976) (''We have repeatedly recognized that
there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be
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federal-state balance in the other state sovereignty doctrines as well. Armed
with state dignity, the states may command greater deference and resist
exercises of federal power with newfound strength. In the next few subparts, I
discuss how dignity may change the future of state regulatory immunity and the
anticommandeering principle.

A. State Regulatory Immunity
The Court's "state regulatory immunity" doctrine has had a troubled
existence. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 293 the Court held that Congress could
constitutionally regulate a state just as it could a private individual.294 That
decision was overruled in part eight years later by National League of Cities v.
Usery, 295 which held that Congress may not regulate states when its legislation
would intrude upon core state governmental functions essential to a state's
separate and independent existence. 296 Nine years later, in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 291 the Court reconsidered National
League of Cities and overruled it entirely as unworkable. 298 Garcia relegated
protection of state sovereignty from excessive federal regulation to the structural
incorporation of state interests in the procedural mechanisms of the federal
government. 299
The Court has never been clear about the constitutional source of state
regulatory immunity, except to assert that it has long recognized statesovereignty limitations on federal power. 300 The dignity rationale might provide
impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affinnative grant of legislative
authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the
authority in that manner."), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 530 (1985); id. at 849 ("The difference, however, is that a State ... is itself a coordinate
element in the system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Union.").
293. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled in part by Nat'1 League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976).
294. See id. at 196-97 ("[W]hile the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations
of commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce because a State is involved. If a State
is engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when
engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal
regulation.").
295. 426 u.s. 833 (1976).
296. See id. at 845, 852 ("We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by [the Commerce
Clause].").
297. 469 u.s. 528 (1985).
298. ld. at 531.
299. See id. at 550-52.
300. See Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842 (''This Court has never doubted that there
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a basis for an attempt to revive National League of Cities. In Coyle v. Smith, 301
the Court refused to allow Congress to condition Oklahoma's admission to the
Union on the placement of its capital. 302 The Court recognized the inherent
dignity of the states 303 and held that Congress lacked the power to "deprive a
new State of any of those attributes essential to its equality in dignity and power
with other States."304 National League of Cities picked up on this reasoning and
asserted, without articulating the precise source or characteristic, that "there are
attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress."305 Though it did not ground its holding in the dignity
rationale, that rationale certainly supports National League ofCities. One might
reason that federal regulation of traditional state governmental functions as if the
states were private individuals does violence to the states' dignity as
independent sovereign entities. 306
In addition, the Court's adoption of the dignity rationale provides a basis for
revisiting Garcia by undermining its two principal determinations. Garcia
overruled National League of Cities as unworkable307 and discarded it because
it "doubt[ed] that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional
are limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its
otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce which are conferred by Art. I of the
Constitution."); id. at 842-43 (citing to the Tenth Amendment as "an express declaration of this
limitation" but then failing to mention the Tenth Amendment or any constitutional provision
thereafter).
301. 221 u.s. 559 (1911).
302. /d. at 574.
303. See id. at 566 ("But what is this power [to admit states]? It is not to admit political
organizations which are less or greater, or different in dignity and power, from those political
entities which constitute the Union."); id. at 567 ("'This Union' was and is a union of States,
equal in power, dignity and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself.").
304. /d. at 568.
305. Nat' I League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
306. I recognize that the idea that dignity might immunize states from certain intrusive
federal regulation is in considerable tension with history. The Articles of Confederation, drafted
to respect the sovereignty of the states, nevertheless permitted federal regulation and
commandeering of the states and the Articles were scrapped in favor of a more nationalizing
charter. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 9 (U.S. 1778). One could certainly argue (as
have I) that if dignity did not immunize states from intrusive regulation under the Articles, it
cannot under the Constitution. See Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, supra note 1, at 411-12, 436;
see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 945-47 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 210 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But the Court does
not find that argument persuasive. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 905-19; New York, 505 U.S. at 16366; PERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 791-96 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
307. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-47 (1985).
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limitations on the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause powers over the States
merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty."308 While
workability is clearly an appropriate concern, the mere fact that the National
League of Cities standard failed does not mean that another must as well, even
if both are based on the same "state sovereignty" backdrop. As I have shown
above, the dignity rationale could quilt together a substantially coherent state
sovereign immunity doctrine; why could it not also support a similar regulatory
immunity doctrine? At the very least, the Court's acceptance of the dignity
rationale signals a potential reconsideration of Garcia's rejection of sovereigntybased rules.
The dignity rationale also, as a constitutional doctrine, undermines Garcia's
adoption of congressional deference. If the dignity rationale is something that
Congress can not obliterate, the Court may well reconsider Garcia's faith in
congressional self-restraint, and may stress that, at the very least, the additional
consideration of state dignity counsels in favor of less lax judicial scrutiny.
I need not go to great lengths to demonstrate that the adoption of the dignity
rationale would lead to the resurrection of a coherent regulatory immunity
doctrine. Suffice it to say that the idea is at least plausible and perhaps, to some,
even enticing. 309 The point is that dignity could drastically alter, for better or for
worse, the regulatory immunity landscape.

B. Anticommandeering
The Court's "anticomrnandeering" doctrine, which prevents Congress from
directing the states to act in a governmental capacity,310 has led to schisms
within the Court311 and academia alike. 312 As in the Eleventh Amendment and
308. Id. at 548.
309. See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
310. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (holding invalid a statute directing the activity of state and
local officials); New York, 505 U.S. at 166 ("The allocation of power contained in the
Commerce Clause ... does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of
interstate commerce.").
311. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 944 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is not a clause, sentence,
or paragraph in the entire text of the Constitution of the United States that supports the
proposition that a local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted by
Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power enumerated in Article I."); New York, 505
U.S. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Tenth Amendment surely does not impose any limit
on Congress' exercise of the powers delegated to it by Article I. Nor does the structure of the
constitutional order or the values of federalism mandate such a formal rule. To the contrary, the
Federal Government directs state governments in many realms.") (citations omitted); id. at 200
(White, J., dissenting) ("I fail to understand the reasoning behind the Court's selective
distinctions among the various aspects of sovereignty that may and may not be waived and do
not believe these distinctions will survive close analysis in future cases.").
312. Compare Evan H. Carninker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
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National League of Cities contexts, the Court is struggling, rather
unsatisfactorily, to find a sound anchor for its anticommandeering principles. 313
The Court is poised to accept a more concrete justification for
anticommandeering, and state dignity may fit the bill nicely.
The anticommandeering doctrine empowers states to resist federal mandates
directed at state governmental mechanisms. The Court has held that the federal
government may direct state agencies to consider certain federal standards in
their ratemaking functions 314 but may not direct state legislatures to enact
affirmative legislation315 or state officials to execute federal mandates. 316 Surely

Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1059-61,
1087-88 (1995) [hereinafter Caminker, State Sovereignty] (rejecting a constitutional
anticommandeering rule), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA.
L. REv. 1957, 2033 (1993) (rejecting a constitutional anticommandeering rule for executives
but accepting a constitutional anticommandeering rule for the legislature), and Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., The Political Economy ofCooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense
and 'Dual Sovereignty' Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 831-47 (1998) (arguing for a
constitutional anticommandeering rule for executives).
313. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (admitting that "no constitutional text speak[s] to this
precise question"); id. at 923 n.l3 ('Th[e dissent's] argument also falsely presumes that the
Tenth Amendment is the exclusive textual source of protection for principles of federalism. Our
system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional provisions .... "). The Court
has hinted that ensuring the proper allocation of political accountability is an important part of
its rationale for the anticommandeering principle. See id. at 930 ("By forcing state governments
to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of
Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems without having to ask their constituents to pay
for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not forced to absorb
the costs of implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame
for its burdensomeness and for its defects."); New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69 ("But where the
Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the
brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus
diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance
with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation."); FERC
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Local citizens hold their
utility commissions accountable for the choices they make. Citizens, moreover, understand that
legislative authority usually includes the power to decide which ideas to debate, as well as
which policies to adopt. Congressional compulsion of state agencies, unlike pre-emption, blurs
the lines of political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their representatives are no
longer responsive to local needs."). But ensuring proper political accountability is a normative,
not constitutional, value, and thus is unsatisfying as aconstitutionaljustification,leaving dignity
as an appropriate substitute.
314. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 765-66.
315. See New York, 505 U.S. 144.
316. See Printz, 521 U.S. 898.
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the state dignity is impinged if the federal government orders the states to act,
and they, like sulking children, must then obey under penalty of punishment.
Some have attacked the anticommandeering doctrine as being in tension with
preemption. Instead of instructing the states to implement congressional policy
choices, Congress can just enact federal law and displace inconsistent state
law. 317 If Congress can preempt the field of regulation and preclude contrary
state action, why can Congress not simply tell the states how to do it in the first
place? The result is basically the same - Congress gets its way - so why
should one method be constitutional and another not?
There is a difference, highlighted by the dignity rationale, between federal
preemption of state regulation and federal commandeering of state mechanisms,
even if the result is the same. That difference is because of the treatment of the
states by the federal government. Preemption is much less condescending to the
states than commandeering. Consider a parent who believes her son should not
play football, despite his enjoyment of the game, because it is too dangerous.
She could either exercise her parental prerogative to call up the coach and
remove him from the team herself, or, she could direct her son to tell the coach
himself that he is quitting. Under the first scenario, the son still has freedom to
assert significant, if futile, dissension. Under the second, the son's own actions
are being dictated to him against his wishes. Surely the latter is the more
degrading.
The dignity rationale favors the ability of the states to waive the right to resist
federal commands. In New York v. United States, 318 the Court held that the
anticommandeering doctrine, as a constitutional limitation on federal power,
could not be consented to by a state. 319 This stance on waiver directly conflicts
with Printz. 320 Adoption of the dignity rationale would side with Printz to
foreclose a prohibition on state consent. Permitting states to waive state
sovereign immunity comports with the dignity rationale, 321 and so should
317. See, e.g., Caminker, State Sovereignty, supra note 312, at 1054-55 (rejecting the
action/inaction distinction).
318. 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
319. /d. at 182 ("Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the
departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state officials ....
State officials thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those
enumerated in the Constitution.").
320. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 910-11 (distinguishing historical statements supporting a
commandeering power on the ground that nothing indicated that "Congress could impose these
[commandeering] responsibilities without the consent of the States").
321. See supra text accompanying notes 274-289; cf New York, 505 U.S. at 200 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("I fail to understand the reasoning behind the Court's selective distinctions among
the various aspects of sovereignty that may and may not be waived and do not believe these
distinctions will survive close analysis in future cases.").
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consent to federal commands. 322 After all, if the dignity rationale justifies
anticommandeering, prohibiting the states from consenting to a federal
legislative command ironically infringes on their dignity by removing their
independent and autonomous authority to do so.
If the Court imports the dignity rationale into the anticommandeering context,
it should rethink its prohibition on federal commandeering of local
governments. Printz held the anticommandeering principle applicable with
equal force to state and local governments. 323 States have sovereign dignity of
a certain magnitude that local governments do not. 324 There is no basis in the
dignity rationale for extending state immunities from federal power to subs tate
units. 325 Subjecting local governments to federal commands not only comports
with the dignity rationale, but it also appropriately aligns the anticommandeering
doctrine with state sovereign immunity jurisprudence.326
There is some tension between the availability of injunctive relief against
state officers under Ex parte Young and the prohibition on commandeering of
state officers under Printz. 327 Dignity helps reconcile the two positions. In the
former, the states and their officers are given a chance to conform to binding
federal law on their own, and are only directed by federal courts if they fail.
Giving state officers prior opportunity to conform to binding federal law
ameliorates any subsequent enforcement's affront to state dignity. The resulting
failure to abide by federal law also justifies a greater need for exercise of direct
federal power over the recalcitrant state officers. In the latter case, the affront
to state dignity is greater because Congress takes state autonomy out of the
officers' hands in the first instance. 328
322. The anticommandeering cases suggest that dignity could be a justification for
unconstitutional conditions under the Spending Power. When the condition is so coercive as
to dip into denigration of what is really not a free choice, state dignity is impaired and the
"condition" becomes a "command." At least one other commentator has noted the relationship
between unconstitutional conditions and the anticommandeering doctrine, though not in the
context of the dignity rationale. See Bohannan, supra note 285, at 323-30.
323. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 955 n.l6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contesting this point).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 252-256.
325. See Althouse, supra note 13, at 262.
326. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 955 n.l6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (faulting the Court for creating
tension with its Eleventh Amendment precedent).
327. See Althouse, supra note 13, at 265 ("If we were really concerned about
'commandeering' the states with lawsuits, we shouldn't tolerate the injunctions that can be had
through the Ex Parte Young device or the lawsuits permitted when sovereign immunity is
abrogated using the Fourteenth Amendment power.").
328. This reconciliation between Ex parte Young and anticommandeering also aligns with
the Court's habeas corpus and federal review doctrines. A federal court will not review a state
decision without first giving the state court the opportunity to reach the right result on its own.
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (''This exhaustion requirement is also
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The result of grafting the dignity rationale onto the anticommandeering
context may be a balancing test as in the state sovereign immunity context, in
spite of Printz's perhaps premature disavowal of any reliance on the balancing
of federalism norms. 329 If the federal government can reach its desired result
through methods less degrading than commandeering, such as through
preemption or the spending power, then the need for a federal commandeering
action cannot justify the resulting degradation of state dignity. 330 The Court may
find the dignity rationale an attractive way to bring principle to the
anticommandeering cases.

V. Conclusion
I wholeheartedly believe the Seminole Tribe decision to be a colossal
mistake. The Court has already embarked on that journey, however, and in this
Article I demonstrate how it may try to avoid compounding its error. Because
the dignity rationale lacks grounding in constitutional text, constitutional
structure, history, or longstanding precedent, the Court faces an opportunity to
fashion the dignity rationale as it wishes. I have suggested here that, precisely
for this reason, the Court may use the dignity rationale to create a more rational
and coherent state sovereign immunity doctrine. I have also suggested,
however, that the embrace of the dignity rationale in the context of state
sovereign immunity may have profound effects on state sovereign immunity and
other state sovereignty doctrines.

grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first
opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's [sic] federal rights.");
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) ("[l]t would be unseemly in our dual system of
government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity
to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation ... ."),overruled in part by Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) ("Upon the State courts,
equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every
right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance
thereof, whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding before them .... If they
fail therein, and withhold or deny rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, the party aggrieved may bring the case from the highest court of
the State in which the question could be decided to this court for final and conclusive
determination.").
329. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 ("But where, as here, it is the whole object of the law to
direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework
of dual sovereignty, such a 'balancing' analysis is inappropriate.").
330. In this way, state dignity may be thought of as a limitation on the Necessary and Proper
Clause, a formulation I have suggested elsewhere. See Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, supra
note 1, at 455 nn. 306-07.
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Accordingly, and above all, the Court must be deliberate and cautious. I do
not profess to identify all, or even a majority of the pitfalls that may arise. I
have not even addressed the obvious tension between the "constitutional" state
sovereignty cases I have discussed above and "subconstitutional" abstention.
My hope is that if the Court is determined to trek down this path, it does so
slowly, carefully, and with the goal of doctrinal coherence.

